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The Supreme Court held that the word “boy” used without 
modification was “not always benign” and could be 
evidence of racially discriminatory intent. 
*** 
After reviewing the record, we conclude once again that 
the use of “boy” by Hatley was not sufficient, either alone 
or with other evidence, to provide a basis for a jury 
reasonably to find that Tyson’s stated reasons for not 
promoting the plaintiffs was racial discrimination.1 
 
ABSTRACT 
In response to the universal belief that Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 is not fulfilling its purpose, this Article presents a 
different perspective on the reality of this federal employment 
discrimination law. Title VII is fulfilling the purpose of the Congress 
that created it. The purpose was not the eradication of all 
discrimination in employment. The purpose was to balance the 
prohibition of the most obvious forms of discrimination with the 
preservation of as much employer decision-making latitude as 
possible. Moreover, the seminal Supreme Court decision, McDonnell 
Douglas v. Green, accurately implemented this balance. This Article 
argues that State law provides the best opportunity to seek the 
eradication of employment discrimination. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
We have chosen to believe that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (“Title VII”) was meant to end employment discrimination and 
have not evaluated the validity of that cognition.2 When I use “we” I 
                                                                                                       
 1. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App’x. 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 2. Cognitive dissonance theory was created by social psychologist Leon Festinger 
in the mid to late 1950s. See, e.g., Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison 
Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954); LEON FESTINGER ET AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS 
(1956); LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). The basic 
premise of the theory is that people are driven to achieve consistency and are motivated 
to make changes in the wake of inconsistency. To describe this drive, Festinger defined 
pieces of knowledge as “cognitions.” “Cognitions” can be abstract or fact based, real or 
imagined. It can be a belief even if the belief is a complete illusion. In this article, 
“cognition” encompasses all of these meanings. “Dissonance” is the inconsistency 
between two or more given variables. “Cognitive dissonance” is the presence of 
inconsistent cognitions, which is experienced as uncomfortable tension. The tension 
has drive-like properties and must be reduced. The greater the magnitude of the 
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mean the scholars, jurists, lawyers, and people who have described or 
would describe Title VII’s purpose as the eradication of employment 
discrimination. Title VII’s purpose was not the eradication of 
employment discrimination. Title VII’s purpose was to preserve as 
much as possible of the extant management prerogatives and union 
freedoms circa 1964. In preserving the status quo, Title VII necessarily 
preserved the beliefs that accompanied those prerogatives. When I use 
the words “status quo” I refer to both the scope of decision making 
implied by prerogatives and the beliefs, including prejudices, 
consistent with the era and with the manner in which those attitudes 
informed personnel decisions. The only thing Congress designed this 
piece of legislation to do was eliminate the worst forms of overt racial 
discrimination.3 Title VII has served that purpose. Title VII works. 
That’s why we don’t like it. 
The persistence of the belief in Title VII’s broad purposes sets up 
an uncomfortable dissonance with knowledge of cases like Ash. 
Anthony Ash and his co-plaintiff John Hithon were black employees in 
the Tyson Foods chicken processing plant in Gadsden, Alabama.4 
Gadsen is about an hour from the city jail in Birmingham, Alabama, 
where, in 1963, Martin Luther King wrote in response to critics who 
wanted him to delay protest marches. He responded that the time for 
waiting was over and supported his response with a list of historical 
wrongs including: “. . . when your first name becomes ‘nigger,’ your 
middle name becomes ‘boy’ (however old you are) and your last name 
becomes ‘John’ . . . .”5 Ash and Hithon were both up for promotion to a 
shift supervisor position which the white decision-maker, Thomas 
Hatley, gave to a white employee.6 Ash and Hithon brought Title VII 
                                                                                                       
dissonance, the greater the drive to reduce the tension, by reducing the discrepancy 
between cognitions. A “discrepant cognition” is one that requires adjustment to reduce 
the tension to a tolerable level. Adjustment can be achieved by replacing a discrepant 
cognition, adding a new cognition that reduces the tension, and/or supplementing or 
changing the discrepant cognition to reduce the tension. 
 3. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (“It is, however, possible and 
necessary for the Congress to enact legislation which prohibits and provides the means 
of terminating the most serious types of discrimination.”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, 
at 2 (1963) (“But this bill can and will commit our Nation to the elimination of many 
of the worst manifestations of racial prejudice.”). 
 4. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 96–RRA–3257–M, 2004 WL 5138005 (N.D. 
Ala. 2004). 
 5. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 84 (1964). 
 6. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x. 529, 531 (11th Cir. 2005). 
44 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 
claims alleging disparate treatment.7 The evidence at the jury trial 
focused on their testimony that Hatley had called them both “boy.”8 
After the district court granted Tyson Foods’ post–trial motion for 
judgment as a matter of law Ash and Hithon appealed.9 Among other 
things, the Eleventh Circuit held that “boy” alone evidenced no racial 
discrimination.10 After remand from the Supreme Court with specific 
instructions to consider “boy” in light of its “context, inflection, tone of 
                                                                                                       
 7. Id. Ash and Hithon also alleged analogous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. It 
was Hithon’s Section 1981 claim that survived, ultimately successfully. See Ash v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 8. Ash and Hithon’s odyssey began in 1995 when they applied for the shift 
supervisor position at the Gadsden plant. Ash, 129 F. App’x. at 531. In the first trial, 
Ash and Hithon won a substantial jury verdict of $250,000.00 in compensatory 
damages and $1,500,000.00 in punitive damages each. Ash, 2004 WL 5138005 at *1. 
Tyson Foods filed a post-trial motion under F.R.C.P. 50(b) challenging the verdict due 
to lack of evidence of pretext. See id. The trial court granted Tyson Food’s Rule 50 
motion and dismissed Ash and Hithon’s claims. See id. at *9-10. The Eleventh Circuit 
Court sustained the trial court’s decision as to Ash, but not Hithon. See Ash, 129 F. 
App’x. at 533-34. On the issue of the significance of the word “boy,” the three judge 
panel held: “the use of the word ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.”. Id. at 
533. The Supreme Court responded that “boy” need not be modified by “black” or 
“white” to become evidence of racial discrimination. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
546 U. S. 454, 456 (2006). “Boy” standing alone could demonstrate discriminatory 
animus. See id. The Court directed the Eleventh Circuit to reflect on the speaker’s 
“context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.” Id. The 
Eleventh Circuit’s response is quoted above. See Ash, 190 F. App’x. at 926. The 
Eleventh Circuit confirmed the dismissal of Ash’s claims and remanded the case for a 
new trial as to Hithon. Id. at 927. Ash and Hithon again sought the Supreme Court’s 
intervention, but the Court denied a second writ of certiorari without comment. See 
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 549 U.S. 1181 (2007). After a second trial, the jury awarded 
Hithon $35,000.00 in back-pay, $300,000.00 for mental anguish damages, and 
$1,000,000.00 in punitive damages. See Hithon v. Tyson Foods, No. 96-RRA-3297, 
2008 WL 4921515 *1 (N.D. Ala. 2008). Tyson Foods filed a Rule 50(b) based on 
insufficient evidence of discrimination, separately challenging the punitive damages 
award. See id. The district court granted Tyson Food’s motion as to punitive damages 
only. Id. at *10. Both sides appealed. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 392 F. App’x. 817 
(11th Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit, again, dismissed Hithon’s discrimination claim 
for failure to prove pretext. See id at 833. There was a dissent this time. See id. The 
basis of Judge Dowd’s dissent was that two juries had found discrimination. Id. 
Because two juries of Hithon’s peers had found discrimination, Hithon’s verdict should 
stand as to liability. Id. Prior to December 2011, Ash and Hithon had nothing to show 
for their fifteen-year investment in this litigation. Hithon’s “successful” claim was 
finally affirmed, as to compensatory damages, on December 16, 2011. See Ash v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 664 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 9. See Ash, 129 F. App’x. at 533-34. 
 10. See id. at 533. 
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voice, local custom, and historical usage”,11 the Eleventh Circuit again 
concluded that “boy” had no legal significance to Ash and Hithon’s 
disparate treatment claims.12 
Even if the Eleventh Circuit judges were ignorant of Dr. King’s 
letter, ignorance of the significance of a white man calling a black man 
“boy” in the middle of Alabama beggars belief. In the Eleventh Circuit, 
and probably elsewhere,13 “boy,” without significant additional 
evidence, has no meaning under Title VII for purposes of proving 
discrimination, despite “local custom and historical usage.”14 If “boy” 
now has no real meaning as a historical signifier of discriminatory 
animus under the law, how far are other socially significant words from 
losing their cultural and legal significance? 
Ash could be described as a signpost pointing at the failure of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Over the course of the Ash 
litigation Tyson Foods avoided liability in a world where all believe 
that Title VII was intended to eradicate discrimination in employment. 
Our knowledge, of Title VII’s purpose, our understanding of the 
                                                                                                       
 11. Ash, 546 U. S. at 456. 
 12. See Ash, 190 F. App’x. at 926. Two juries understood that “boy” had a special 
meaning according to local custom and historical usage. Those juries demonstrated this 
understanding by awarding Hithon more than $1,000,000.00 twice. What makes the 
case worthy of attention is that the Eleventh Circuit needed significantly more than the 
obvious custom and usage of “boy” in the south to cause them to reconsider their 
conclusion that “boy” as used in the case had no legal significance. See Ash, 664 F.3d 
at 896-98. The issue remains unresolved how the Eleventh Circuit consciously or 
unconsciously determined to ignore local custom and historical usage after specific 
direction to do so by the Supreme Court. 
 13. See Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to 
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 562 (2001) [hereinafter Hard to Win] (“Race discrimination 
claims are generally thought to be the most difficult employment claim to succeed on, 
and when it comes to race, the courts’ bias tends toward our common definition of 
bias.”). 
 14. See Ash, 546 U. S. at 456. “Boy” is the polite word for “nigger” in certain 
circles. In the middle of Alabama, the connection was so obvious and dangerous that 
the defense successfully blocked an attempt by Ash’s counsel to elicit the connection 
on the ground that the testimony would be unduly prejudicial. Ash, 664 F.3d at 896 n. 
8. The Ash drama is particularly ironic given the reference to Alabama in Dr. King’s 
speech: 
I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its 
governor having his lips dripping with the words of interposition and nullification; one 
day right there in Alabama, little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands 
with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers.. 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED 
THE WORLD 105 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1992) [hereinafter I HAVE A DREAM] 
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history and context of the word “boy” and our cognition of the result in 
Ash create a cognitive dissonance. Ash should not be possible if our 
first two pieces of knowledge are accurate. To resolve the tension, 
however, we do not check the accuracy of the first cognition; we 
supplement our information with the cognition that Title VII is not 
working. Or, if we admit that Title VII itself is not broken, we justify 
our understanding that something is not working by blaming the 
Supreme Court for erroneous and illegitimate interpretation. If we are 
wrong to believe that Title VII was meant to eradicate employment 
discrimination, we are wrong when we say it doesn’t work. If we are 
wrong and a statutory basis exists for the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Title VII in disparate treatment cases, we are wrong to 
blame the Court for creating the tension we feel. I think we are wrong. 
That we consider cases like Ash as contrary to Title VII’s purpose is a 
manifestation of our cognitive dissonance.15 The discrepant cognition is 
the belief that Title VII was intended to do more, in its structure or by 
interpretation, than prevent gross acts of employment discrimination.16 
                                                                                                       
 15. It is the behavior, demonstrated by the use of “boy,” and the belief system, also 
demonstrated by the use of “boy,” and the Eleventh Circuit’s approval of that behavior 
and belief system that causes the tension when we believe that the point of Title VII is 
to prohibit the behavior and, perhaps more importantly, to cause society to jettison the 
supporting belief system. What we want is for people, like Thomas Hatley, and 
employers, like Tyson Foods, to experience unwanted or negative consequences for 
their behavior where they would have no latitude in rejecting the consequences, but 
must relieve the tension by changing their attitudes and behavior, including the 
acceptance of the responsibility for the impact of their earlier conduct and prejudice. 
See JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY 74-80 
(2007). 
 16. Much scholarship reflects the underlying premise that Title VII should be able 
to attack less than obvious discrimination because Title VII was intended to end 
discrimination in employment. See, e.g., Natasha Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO L. 
REV. 313, 315 (2010) (“Plaintiffs have a hard row to hoe in proving unlawful 
discriminatory bias. Without the smoking gun document, the blatant biased statement, 
or other direct evidence, plaintiffs must rely on a variety of factual circumstances to 
weave a story that convinces the fact-finder that an employer’s actions constitute 
unlawful discrimination.”); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured 
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 
B.C. L. REV. 203, 210 (1993) (“In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Congress 
stressed that equal employment opportunity is a basic right in this country. The 
legislature noted that the other civil rights the Act guaranteed would be meaningless 
without the right to ‘gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize 
them.’”); Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now 
Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 940 (1995) (“Title VII molded the basic 
moral principle of equal treatment into a national policy to eliminate employment 
discrimination.”); Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception 
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This Article presents a new cognition of Title VII. Title VII was 
never meant to perform the role of eradicating employment 
discrimination in disparate treatment cases. For disparate treatment, 
Title VII set a low standard of proscribed behavior that has since been 
recognized by the Supreme Court and approved by Congress. The 
limited scope of the proscribed behavior sustains an environment 
where a court does not recognize a white man calling a black man 
“boy” in the middle of Alabama as evidence of discriminatory animus. 
Part I of this article describes the illusion we have been socialized to 
believe about Title VII’s purposes with the Court playing a significant 
leadership role in creating and sustaining the illusion. Part II reveals 
the illusion by focusing on Title VII’s original political, legal and 
social context and relies on the legislative history to show how 
Congress intentionally limited Title VII’s scope. In Part III, the 
discussion turns to McDonnell Douglas v. Green,17 because of its 
perennial relevance as the Supreme Court’s first and most enduring 
interpretation of Title VII in the context of disparate treatment.18 I 
argue that a firm statutory basis exists for McDonnell Douglas as an 
accurate and legitimate interpretation of Title VII.19 Finally, Part IV 
proposes that the alternative to the existing Title VII is not in an appeal 
to Congress or the Court.20 The better opportunity for advancing 
                                                                                                       
and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial 
Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1487-88 (1997) [hereinafter Some Thoughts] (“Most 
recently, in 1992, we demonstrated how the federal courts, and particularly the 
Supreme Court, had significantly weakened Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
by construing procedural rules in a consistently pro-defendant manner.”). 
 17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 18. McDonnell Douglas remains viable even after Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 
U.S. 90 (2003), which was hailed as the death knell of the burden shifting analysis 
scholars have found so troubling. See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est 
Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the 
Transformaition of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a 
“Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003). 
 19. But see, Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without A Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell 
Douglas is not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 
743 (2006) (arguing that there is no statutory basis for the Supreme Court’s McDonnell 
Douglas interpretation of Title VII). 
 20. I am not the first to suggest that the Supreme Court and Congress should not be 
the sole objects of efforts to actually achieve the elimination of employment 
discrimination. In 1997 Professors Brown, Subrin and Baumann decided not to make 
“suggestions for further tinkering with the language of Title VII,” but suggested that 
judges confront the likelihood of their implicit bias and that juries be instructed on the 
pervasiveness of implicit bias. See Some Thoughts, supra note 16, at 1489-91. 
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employment discrimination laws which prevent cases like Ash lies in 
state law. Individual states offer much better resources for moving 
away from a Title VII that works in such unsatisfying ways. 
 
I. MISUNDERSTANDING TITLE VII’S PURPOSE 
Describing our knowledge of Title VII’s purposes as a 
misunderstanding does not mean that our belief is entirely without 
basis21; a rational basis exists for the belief that Title VII’s purpose is 
the eradication of discrimination in employment. For example, in 
McDonnell Douglas the Supreme Court told us that “Title VII tolerates 
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”22 The strength of the 
misunderstanding, like a discrepant cognition, lies in the choice to 
accept that statement, and others like it,23 as true, accurate and 
correct.24 Ironically, the main source of conflicting information is 
                                                                                                       
 21. The argument I am making is that Title VII was meant only to limit the very 
worst kinds of discrimination. Therefore, a conception of Title VII as a vehicle for the 
eradication of all discrimination or even subtle forms of discrimination is the 
discrepant cognition in need of replacement. See id. at 1491 (recognizing the futility of 
redrafting Title VII). 
 22. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). 
 23. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) 
(“Congress enacted Title VII . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities by 
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 
(1975) (“[T]he primary objective [of Title VII] was a prophylactic one.”); Johnson v. 
Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1975) (“It creates statutory rights against 
invidious discrimination in employment and establishes a comprehensive scheme for 
the vindication of those rights.”); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 
273, 283 (1976) (“The Act prohibits all racial discrimination in employment, with 
exception for any group of particular employees . . . .”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71(1977) (“The emphasis both in the language and the 
legislative history of the statute is on eliminating discrimination in employment . . . .”); 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (“The primary 
purpose of Title VII was ‘to assure equality of employment opportunities and to 
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially 
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.’”); Oscar Mayer & 
Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (Title VII’s purpose is “the elimination of 
discrimination in the workplace”); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 
(1979) (“Congress’ primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial 
discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with ‘the plight of the 
Negro in our economy.’”); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) (“The 
‘primary objective’ of Title VII is to bring employment discrimination to an end . . . .); 
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant purpose of the title, of 
course, is to root out discrimination in employment.”). 
 24. The force of this statement and others like it has cemented this cognition of 
2012] TITLE VII WORKS – THAT’S WHY WE DON’T LIKE IT 49 
McDonnell Douglas25and its progeny which make proving disparate 
treatment almost impossible.26 McDonnell Douglas is internally 
dissonant in setting up the cognition of Title VII’s purpose as broadly 
remedial and denying that purpose in practice.27 The difficulty in 
proving disparate treatment is seen, however, as a problem of 
interpretation rather than a fundamental problem with Title VII’s 
structure.28 The disparate cognition of Title VII’s purposes is so strong 
                                                                                                       
Title VII to such a degree that it looks more like a behavior than an attitude. In the 
drive to relieve the tension caused by cognitive dissonance, attitudes usually change 
before behaviors because behaviors are harder to change. See COOPER, supra note 15, 
at 2. In dispelling the tension of the dissonance between this cognition, which relates 
strongly to the belief about Title VII’s structure and its history as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and the actual outcomes in cases like Ash, which are based on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII, we are driven to resolve the tension by 
focusing on the Court’s errors in limiting the ability of Title VII to eradicate 
discrimination in employment. In short, the belief in Title VII’s purposes is stronger 
than the belief in the Court’s ability to properly interpret it. So, the latter belief changes 
to accommodate a consistent view of Title VII’s ability to eradicate employment 
discrimination, subtle or otherwise. 
 25. 411 U.S. at 801(“Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or 
otherwise.”). 
 26. McDonnell Douglas established the basic framework of the three-part burden 
shifting analysis in cases alleging disparate treatment based on circumstantial evidence. 
See id. at 802-03. (First, the plaintiff establishes a presumption of discrimination by 
showing that he was a qualified, racial minority, who was not hired, and the job 
remained unfilled or was filled by someone with the same qualifications, who was not 
a racial minority. Second, the employer has to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment decision. Third, the presumption of discrimination 
disappears and the employee has to prove discrimination by showing that employer’s 
reason was just a pretext for discrimination.). An employer need not assert a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason at all. However, then, it faces the possibility that a plaintiff 
will establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 
509 U. S. 502, 510 (1993). If that risk is unacceptable, an employer need only assert a 
reason for the challenged decision, other than the plaintiff’s prescribed characteristic. 
Id. At that point, the presumption of discrimination disappears. Id. This evolution of 
McDonnell Douglas has been sharply criticized. See The Honorable Timothy M. 
Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503, 519-24 (2008). 
Aside from the criticism, disparate treatment cases (particularly those claiming racial 
discrimination) have been ably demonstrated. See generally Hard to Win, supra note 
13, at 562 (“Race and discrimination claims are generally thought to be the most 
difficult employment claim to succeed on, and when it comes to race, the courts’ bias 
tends toward our common definition of bias.”). 
 27. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme 
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 324-28 (1997) [hereinafter Supreme Court 
Rhetoric]. 
 28. See generally Van Detta, supra note 18; Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell 
Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 (2007); William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment 
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that we do not effectively question the foundation for the knowledge.29 
The illusion that Title VII was meant to eradicate employment 
discrimination also stems from our attachment to the Civil Rights Era.30 
The Civil Rights Era provides the reference point for the beginning of 
life in a meritocracy31 focused on the country’s fundamental promise to 
give faithful meaning to these words: “We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, 
                                                                                                       
Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81 (2009). 
 29. See note 23,supra, discussing the reasons for the strength of the belief that Title 
VII is meant to eradicate discrimination in employment. 
 30. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of 
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act And Its 
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1537 (2003) (“The trouble with [the] heroic 
picture is that we may well come away with a distorted view of what actually happened 
within Congress between the summers of 1963 and 1964.”). 
The strength of the belief in Title VII’s purpose has deep roots in the meaning of the 
Civil Rights Era. As a culture, the Civil Rights Era allowed America to be reborn with 
the blood of hundreds of years of oppression washed away. It seemed that the Central 
American promise of equality became real overnight. President Kennedy addressed the 
nation on June 1, 1963, echoing Lincoln’s opening lines to the Gettysburg Address: 
that the country was “founded on the principle that all men are created equal . . .” See 
infra note 33. Two months later, Martin Luther King, standing literally at Lincoln’s 
feet, invoked the foundation principle of the nation. See infra note 31. By passing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law Congress fulfilled the core American promise. Yet, 
this epochal event could not have happened without Lincoln, Kennedy and King to 
remind the Nation to keep its faith. They are heroes. Their deaths by assassination 
made them also martyrs. Culturally, we, the heirs of heroes, have the Civil Right Act of 
1964. The purpose of Title VII is informed by our kinship with our heroes and their 
gift of civil rights. If we are to retain a cultural sense of American exceptionalism 
stemming from our heroic heritage in the civil rights struggle, our inheritance, in this 
case Title VII, must also reflect exceptionalism. Charles P. Henry, Long Overdue, 28 
(2007). Therefore, Title VII’s purpose could not be anything less than a zero-tolerance 
policy for employment discrimination. If, on the other hand, Title VII’s purpose is 
limited to preventing or suppressing the worst forms of overt discrimination while 
allowing for subtle forms of discrimination based in subjective considerations like 
personal animosity, the result is not particularly exceptional and neither are the 
achievements of the Civil Rights Era. 
 31. See I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 14 (“content of their character”); President 
John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address 1961 (Jan. 20, 1961),  
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntFl7SVAjA.aspx?gclid=CMi1pLeqxa8CFecSNAod-E7fYg 
(“ask what you can do for your country”). This meritocracy consisted of two 
interlocking parts: a stress on individual success based on talent and ability, and 
colorblindness – color cannot be allowed to make any difference if “all men are created 
equal.” 
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liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”32 On June 1, 1963, John F. 
Kennedy not only reminded Americans that the country was “founded 
on the principle that all men are created equal,”33 he told Americans 
that he was going to see that the nation fulfilled its promise.34 Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech echoed the key 
theme of meritocracy.35 By passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 
“Act”) into law Congress finally fulfilled the core American promise to 
make meritocracy the American reality.36 For some, President Barack 
Hussein Obama’s election in 2008 proves the successful attainment of 
meritocracy.37 
                                                                                                       
 32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The reality of slavery 
and the fact that slaves weren’t “men” in a constitutional sense, made it impossible for 
America to live up to this promise. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves at 3/5ths of a person); COOPER, supra note 
15, at 150. (“The historical inconsistency between the famous phrase in 
the Declaration of Independence that ‘All men are created equal’ and the reality of the 
Black experience in antebellum America has been replaced by the inconsistency 
between the philosophy of equal opportunity and the reality of poverty, 
underemployment, and discrimination. In short, to live in twenty-first century America 
as a member of a minority group is to experience the double consciousness that 
frequently treats one as equal in philosophy and less than equal in practice.”). 
 33. See President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American 
People on Civil Rights, (June 11, 1963), http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-
Reference/JFK-Speeches/Radio-and-Television-Report-to-the-American-People-on-
Civil-Rights-June-11-1963.aspx [hereinafter Report on Civil Rights]. 
 34. See id. (“Now the time has come for the Nation to fulfill its promise. * * * Next 
week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has 
not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life 
or law. * * * I am, therefore, asking the Congress to enact legislation giving all 
Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the public. . . . I am also 
asking Congress to authorize the Federal Government to participate more fully in 
lawsuits designed to end segregation in public education. * * * Other features will also 
be requested, including greater protection for the right to vote.”). 
 35. On August 28, 1963, standing literally at Lincoln’s feet, King told his listeners, 
including Kennedy, 
In a sense we have come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of 
our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to 
fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, 
would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 14, at 102. 
 36. See Brookins, supra note 16, at 940. 
 37. See, e.g., WILLIAM JELANI COBB, THE SUBSTANCE OF HOPE: BARACK OBAMA 
AND THE PARADOX OF PROGRESS (2010); JABARI ASIM, WHAT OBAMA MEANS…FOR 
OUR CULTURE, OUR POLITICS, OUR FUTURE 218 (2009) (“The remnants of old-school 
racism that reared up in certain quarters prior to election day were not revealed as 
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The Supreme Court has been instrumental in confirming the 
disparate cognition of Title VII’s purpose.38 The Court has found “that 
Congress’ primary purpose was the prophylactic one of achieving 
equality of employment ‘opportunities’ and removing ‘barriers’ to such 
equality.”39 A more emotionally satisfying version of the same idea is 
the pronouncement that Title VII is part of “a complex legislative 
design directed at a historic evil of national proportions.”40 These 
statements have no textual foundation in Title VII. Earlier versions of 
what became Title VII possessed a congressional declaration of 
purpose: “that it is the national policy to protect the right of the 
individual to be free from [employment] discrimination.”41 This 
specific declaration of purpose did not survive as part of Title VII.42 A 
more detailed look at Title VII’s legislative history provides significant 
information for assessing a change in our beliefs regarding its purpose. 
 
II. TITLE VII’S REAL PURPOSE 
The words “Title VII’s purpose is to eradicate employment 
                                                                                                       
omens of a November surprise but exposed as the last gasps of a dying pathology.”). 
At least in his speeches, particularly his inaugural address, the President also gives the 
impression that his election was a culmination. Theme of the inauguration, “A new 
birth of freedom,” from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address links President Obama to the 
foundation promise of the nation, the breach of which Lincoln lamented and the 
fulfillment of which President Obama celebrated. The President specifically remarks 
on the completion of the Civil Rights effort: 
What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility . . . This is 
the meaning of our liberty and our creed – why men and women and 
children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across 
this magnificent Mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty 
years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can stand 
before you and take a most sacred oath. 
President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address 13 (Jan. 20, 2009),  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. 
 38. See note 23 supra and cases cited therein. 
 39. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 449 (1982). 
 40. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 416 (1975). 
 41. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963). 
 42. This declaration of policy was Section 701(a) of what would become Title VII 
until the omnibus civil rights bill left the House for the Senate in late 1963. Senator 
Dirksen’s amendments deleted this statement of purpose. See Rodriguez & Weingast, 
supra note 30, at 1493 (“To the extent that Dirksen rationally feared that the broad 
phrasing of Section 701(a) would authorize courts to expand the scope of the Act, his 
intent in deleting it seems rather prescient.”). See also Part II.B. infra, describing Title 
VII’s legislative history. 
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discrimination” do not appear in its text.43 Nor does the statement: “In 
the implementation of [personnel decisions], it is abundantly clear that 
Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”44 It is 
wrong to expect to see those words in Title VII. Title VII was, after all, 
a quid pro quo for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;45 the 
compromise was to limit Title VII’s reach and preserve the status 
quo.46 This included: entirely prospective legislation; the commitment 
to retain as much of existing management prerogatives in personnel 
decisions as possible; and a focus only on overt gross acts of 
discrimination. Proponents of the status quo co-opted meritocracy to 
move this agenda into Title VII. 
 
A.  Background 
An accurate understanding of Title VII’s real purposes must focus 
on its legal, social and political contexts. This combination of contexts 
chiefly describes the thinking of the politicians in intentionally limiting 
                                                                                                       
 43. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has no preamble stating its purpose, nor do any of 
its component Titles. A statement of the purpose and content of the legislation that 
would become the Act comes from House Report 88-914, November 20, 1963 on 
House Resolution 7152. According to the report, “The bill, as amended, is designed 
primarily to protect and provide more effective means to enforce the civil rights of 
persons within the jurisdiction of the Unites States.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 16 
(1963). The General Statement to the report describes that H.R. 7152 
[i]s designed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of discrimination on 
a nationwide basis. It is general in application and national in scope. No 
bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and 
consequences of racial or other types of discrimination against 
minorities. There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership 
provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most 
troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary 
or local resolution of other forms of discrimination. It is, however, 
possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation which 
provides the means of terminating the most serious types of 
discrimination. This H.R. 7152, as amended, would achieve in a number 
of related areas. * * * It would eliminate discrimination in employment. 
. . . 
Id. at 18. The report’s section-by-section analysis of Title VII states: “The 
purpose of this tile is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and 
informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on 
race, color, religion or national origin.” Id. at 26. 
 44. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). 
 45. CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 37 (1985) [hereinafter WHALENS]. 
 46. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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Title VII to the immediate issues at hand and simultaneously 
preventing Title VII, with the Court’s assistance, from eradicating all 
but the most overt forms of employment discrimination. 
In 1963 and 1964, Civil Rights legislation and the idea of a 
federal fair employment practices law was not new.47 There was a 
critical mass of state laws seemingly aimed at employment 
discrimination.48 A related and very powerful body of federal law also 
existed in the field of labor relations.49 The nation also recently adopted 
meritocracy as its goal.50 Moreover, a tension existed between federal 
labor law and the employment at will doctrine developed under the 
state law. That tension must be given credit for the role it played in 
guiding Congressional intentions in drafting Title VII’s text.51 Finally, 
if we look at the kind of discrimination it took to fully animate the 
national debate over civil rights,52 we should better understand the 
nature of the discrimination Congress ultimately prohibited under Title 
VII. 
 
1. Influences of Existing Jurisprudence 
A serious question for the legislators working for and against 
civil rights was the nature of the change in scope of existing 
management prerogatives in the private sector.53 Historically, 
                                                                                                       
 47. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 
(1957); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960). As to 
employment discrimination, the bills that fathered Title VII were H.R. 10144 “Federal 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act” in 1963 and H.R. 405 “Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1963.” See also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 
B.C. L. REV. 431 (1966) (“In the legislative branch of the federal government, this 
history of FEP legislation prior to 1964 was characterized by repeated failures for civil 
rights advocates.”) (giving a brief chronicle of these failures starting in 1941). 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2302 (1963) (“Testimony before the committee has 
indicated that Federal legislation is necessary despite the existence of fair employment 
practice laws in almost half the States.”). 
 49. See National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-168). 
 50. See supra Part I. 
 51. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 52. See infra Part II.A.2. Professor Selmi has observed that the Supreme Court 
cannot see anything, but the kind of discrimination that brought on the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27, at 284, 335 (“Once the signs 
denominating ‘colored’ and ‘white’ facilities were taken down, it has been difficult for 
the Court to understand what legal problem remained.”). 
 53. See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an 
Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 
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management prerogatives found expression in the at will employment 
doctrine.54 Under that doctrine an employer could take any personnel 
action for any or no reason.55 Clearly, refusing jobs or promotions to 
blacks fell squarely within management prerogatives.56 Such decisions 
also found ample support in the reigning social mores.57 
It was not until the New Deal Era that federal law made any 
significant inroads into at-will employment. One of the favored 
children of the New Deal, the National Labor Relations Act, curbed 
management prerogatives, but only in a very limited way.58 It became a 
national policy, enforced directly by a federal agency, the National 
Labor Relations Board, to prevent the exercise of the full scope of 
management prerogatives, but only to the degree that the right to deny 
or terminate employment no longer included union activity as a 
reason.59 
The existence of a federal mandate for a federal agency to 
prosecute unlawful discrimination gave the right being protected 
enhanced status. Once an employee filed an unfair labor practice 
charge with the NLRB, the NLRA transfigured that individual’s private 
right to a public right.60 The actions of the NLRB after receipt of the 
                                                                                                       
453, 458 (2008); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976). 
 54. See Deborah L. Markowitz, The Demise of At-Will Employment and the Public 
Employee Conundrum, 27 URB. LAW. 305, 308 (1995). 
 55. See Bales, supra note 53, at 461 (describing at-will employment as a “doctrine 
whereby an employer has nearly absolute control over employment terms.”). 
 56. See id. Since race would fall under the heading of “any” reason and there was 
no protection for racial discrimination under the NLRA until 1964, and no effective 
protection under state fair employment practices laws, any employer could use race as 
a reason for an adverse employment decision. 
 57. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, 149-88 (3d ed. 
1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Improving the Economic Status of Negros Through Laws 
Against Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 818 
(1967) (“Questions of style and beauty as well as other even less easily identified 
considerations constantly shape business (and employment) decisions. Matters of 
individual taste are involved and cannot be eliminated without gross impingement on 
individual freedom and quite intolerable substantive results.”). 
 58. See Markowitz, supra note 54, at 309-10; Robert J. Affeldt, Title VII in the 
Federal Courts – Private or Public Law: Part I, 14 VILL. L. REV. 664, 666-67 (1969) 
[hereinafter Affeldt Part I]. 
 59. See National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-168). 
 60. At least that was the perspective of commentators in the aftermath of the 
passage of the Civil Right Act of 1964, who compared the Title VII with the NLRA 
and concluded that the rights under Title VII compared to those under the NLRA were 
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charge vindicated the public policy of the NLRA: empowering 
individuals to engage in collective action to balance the power of 
management at the bargaining table as the best way to achieve lasting 
industrial harmony.61 
If Title VII were to mirror the NLRA, the right to be free from 
discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, national 
origin or sex would identify discrimination under Title VII as harm to 
the individual and society as a whole.62 The less Title VII resembles the 
NLRA, particularly as to the existence of a federal agency tasked with 
enforcement, the less employment discrimination resembles a public 
wrong.63 Wrongs under Title VII would then be private rather than 
public, and “not so injurious to the community to justify the 
intervention of the public law enforcement authorities.”64 
Employment discrimination, as something not cognizable as a 
national public wrong necessarily implicates federalism.65 Indeed, a 
                                                                                                       
not public. See Affeldt Part I, supra note 58, at 672-78 (arguing why discrimination is 
a “public wrong”); Stuart A. Morse, Comment, The Scope of Judicial Relief Under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 TEX. L. REV. 516, 520 (1968) [hereinafter 
Morse] (had it retained its NLRB-like powers, the EEOC “would not have adjudicated 
private rights, but would have acted in the public interest to obtain broad compliance . . 
. .”); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 432 (1965) [hereinafter Enforcement of Fair Employment] 
(“As originally conceived, Title VII would primarily have established a ‘public’ right 
and only incidentally created a private one. Like the NLRA, Title VII was to have been 
enforced by a federal agency empowered to eliminate discriminatory practices by 
issuing cease-and-desist orders.”). 
 61. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-168). 
 62. See Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 67 (1964). 
 63. See Morse, supra note 60, at 520. 
 64. Berg, supra note 62, at 67. See also, Article, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: 
Present Operation and Proposals for Improvement, 5 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7 
(1969) [hereinafter Present Operation] (Title VII, by making enforcement a private 
action with private remedies, “[creates] a private right.”); Affeldt Part I, supra note 58, 
at 672 (“if the courts view the charging party’s suit as a private suit, with no public 
interest, the Title is again doomed.”); Enforcement of Fair Employment, supra note 60, 
at 432. 
 65. The NLRA, as an expression of national policy preempts state law under 
Section 301; WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 
(1964) (“If in the United States one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of 
federalism.”). Professor Riker concluded that the main, although not sole, beneficiaries 
of American Federalism were Southern Whites. The normative question on the value 
of American federalism for Professor Riker was “a judgment on the values of 
segregation and racial oppression.” Id. at 153. I am indebted to Professor Charlton C. 
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critical mass of states had employment discrimination laws in the 
period immediately preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act.66 
The issue of employment discrimination remained a problem in almost 
all of these states.67 If federalism suborns racism,68 then one would 
have to conclude that any federal employment discrimination law 
would be doomed to failure if it relied on the states for investigation 
and enforcement.69 From that perspective, the nature of any balance 
struck that limited central authority in favor of local autonomy would 
speak volumes about the value of the rights protected under Title VII 
vis-a-vis existing management prerogatives under the at-will 
employment doctrine. 
 
2. Civil Rights Era Discrimination70 
The meaning of “discrimination” in the Civil Rights Era is 
obviously not susceptible of definition with one hundred percent 
accuracy. Never-the-less, one thing Congress’ failure to define 
“discrimination” suggests is that there was a common understanding of 
the word, which taken together with the practices that Congress 
determined would and would not be unlawful under Title VII, gives a 
                                                                                                       
Copeland of the University of Miami School of Law for causing me to consider the 
impact of federalism on segregation in American society, generally, and how America 
handles discrimination in employment specifically. Issues of federalism arose during 
the debate over Title VII in Congress and ultimately caused the EEOC to have to take a 
back seat to state fair employment practices entities. H.R. Rep. No. 87-1370, at 5, 8; 
H.R. Rep. No. 88-570, at 16, 19; 110 Cong. Rec. 12721, 12723, 14327, 14329, 14331. 
 66. Berg, supra note 62, at 67 n. 10. 
 67. In those states with fair employment practice laws, the House Committee on 
Education and Labor considered these problems twofold: “Second, State [sic] laws 
very [sic] in coverage and effectiveness. Third, State [sic] commissions have 
encountered difficulty in dealing with large, multiphased operations of business in 
interstate commerce.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2302-03 (1963); see also Present 
Operation, supra note 64, at 12-13 (“State fair employment practices laws have been 
largely ineffective due to lax enforcement and the paucity of complaints. The low level 
of complaints has been attributed to apathy, fear and distrust of state fair employment 
practices commissions.”). 
 68. See RIKER, supra note 65, at 155. 
 69. See supra note 64. 
 70. I am purposefully excluding from this discussion “discrimination” as used and 
understood under the federal labor law. Discrimination under that law was linked to the 
exercise of a legal right granted by the federal government. It has a distinctly different 
flavor from decisions based solely on readily identifiable characteristics, like race or 
skin color, which requires the holder of that characteristic to do nothing more than 
exist. 
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very good picture of the nature of the discrimination in employment 
that Congress proscribed.71 The common understanding of actions that 
amounted to “discrimination” and Title VII’s text supply a definition 
that does not encompass much more than a personnel decision that 
obtained almost solely because an individual was black. 
A common understanding of “discrimination” in the Civil Rights 
Era should capture both the most dramatic influences on the changes in 
the American conscience that made meritocracy/colorblindness a key 
feature of the Era and the more nuanced behaviors of the people 
involved in the passage of the Act.72 There are many events of the Civil 
Rights era that riveted the public’s attention on the “Negro Problem.”73 
A non-exhaustive list of the highlights includes the trial for the murder 
of Emmitt Till in Money, Mississippi, the integration of Central High 
School in Little Rock, Arkansas, the Montgomery, Alabama bus 
boycott, and the events in Birmingham, Alabama that catalyzed the 
Kennedy administration to submit omnibus civil rights legislation to 
Congress.74 These events served to publicize the level of violence and 
                                                                                                       
 71. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 341 (1990) (discussing alternative 
meanings for “discrimination” in Title VII in their critique of textualism as a valid 
foundation principle for statutory interpretation). As discussed in Part II.B.2. however, 
Congress was aware of definitions of discrimination put forth by witnesses testifying 
on behalf of H.R. 405, the sire of Title VII. These proposed definitions linked 
discrimination to any reliance on subjective criteria for personnel decisions. The fact 
that these definitions did not appear in Title VII suggests an intention to allow 
subjectivity to continue to play the role it had always played, so long as race was not 
the only reason for an adverse employment decision. 
 72. C. Vann Woodward’s insights on segregation give an idea of the nuances when 
he describes segregation as a physical distance, rather than a social distance: “physical 
separation of people for reasons of race. Its opposite is not necessarily ‘integration’ . . . 
nor ‘equality.’” WOODWARD, supra note 57, at xi-xii. 
 73. These events have been chronicled in such works as TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING 
THE WATERS: AMERICA AND THE KING YEARS 1954-1963 (1988); DAVID J. GARROW, 
BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, (First Vintage Books ed. 1988); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1964-1992 (rev. ed. 1993). 
 74. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note at 71, at 342-43 (discussing the influence of 
context on meaning). Although I agree with Professors Eskridge and Frickey that these 
kinds of images should inform our understanding of discrimination circa 1964, I think 
they inform only a general understanding and not one that translates, without more, to 
Title VII. Kennedy’s address to the Nation and his civil rights legislation said nothing 
about equal employment opportunities for blacks in the public sector. Even after the 
famous March on Washington For Jobs and Freedom, where Dr. King delivered the “I 
Have a Dream” speech, Kennedy dismissed the notion of a strong equal employment 
opportunity law as antithetical to the purpose of passing omnibus civil rights 
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animosity directed at blacks solely because they were black. This 
elevated the issue of making decisions or taking actions based on race 
or color to a national moral question.75 
On a less graphic level, the problem of discrimination was also 
largely understood as a physical reaction to skin color alone. This was 
true in organized labor.76 In other parts of society the issue was 
described as having to associate with blacks,77 work alongside blacks,78 
live in the same neighborhood as blacks79 or serve blacks80 because 
they were black. “Discrimination” can, therefore, be understood as 
equal to segregation. This meaning of “discrimination” has two 
overlapping aspects. First, it captures the enforced de facto or de jure 
                                                                                                       
legislation. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 26-27. 
 75. See I HAVE A DREAM, supra note 14, at 102 (“In a sense we have come to our 
nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the 
magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were 
signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a 
promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the 
unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”); Report on Civil 
Rights, supra note 33 (“This Nation was founded by men of many nations and 
backgrounds. It was founded on the principle that all men are created equal, and that 
the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened. * * * 
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is as 
clear as the American Constitution.”). The immediate forefather of Title VII, H.R. 405, 
would have contained a finding that “discrimination in employment . . . is contrary to 
American principles of liberty and equality of opportunity, is incompatible with the 
Constitution . . . .” See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2305-06 (1963). 
 76. See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 
(1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Michael A. 
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. 
REV. 563, 565 (1962) (“Indeed in some sectors of the economy unions have more to 
say about who gets jobs than employers do. And those exercising this power have not 
always been color-blind. It is not merely that some unions have refused, either 
explicitly or tacitly, to admit Negroes to membership and that others have relegated 
them to segregated locals. These are not insignificant handicaps and affronts, but they 
are obviously secondary in importance to the use of union power to confine Negroes to 
the lowest job classifications of some enterprises and to exclude them from others all 
together.”) (citations omitted); H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963) (Discrimination 
by labor organizations, particularly certain construction unions, with respect to 
membership and training is widespread.”). 
 77. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Harvey M. Applebaum, 
Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49 (1964). 
 78. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963) (“Segregated locals still exist despite 
continuous statements of opposition by national labor leaders.”). 
 79. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
 80. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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physical separation of people.81 Picture two drinking fountains one for 
“white” one for “colored.” Second, it captures the contemporary action 
of relegating people to positions commensurate with preconceived and 
constantly reinforced beliefs as to limitations on their abilities based on 
skin color alone.82 In the end, despite the fact that there was no means 
to start a discussion of what it meant to use words like “nigger” or 
“boy,” there was a common understanding that discrimination was at 
least an intentional adverse response to race alone.83 
Turning to Title VII, the language suggests that Congress was 
addressing by permission or prohibition personnel decisions related to 
skin color alone rather than some more subtle form of discrimination.84 
                                                                                                       
 81. See WOODWARD, supra note 57, at xi. 
 82. Reporting on Title VII’s forerunner, H.R. 405, the Committee on Education and 
Labor seemed to view even “subtle” forms of discrimination as segregating behavior; a 
physical action. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963) (“Job discrimination most is 
extant in almost every area of employment and in every area of the country. It ranges 
patent absolute rejection to more subtle forms of invidious distinctions. Most 
frequently, it manifests itself through relegation to ‘traditional’ positions and through 
discriminatory promotional practices.”). The recognition of “discrimination” as a 
function of skin color did not include what we now call expressions of bias. Nigger, for 
example, was not a strange word to Supreme Court Justice James Clark McReynolds, 
or Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, or Johnson. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: 
THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD 9-10 (Vintage Books ed. 2003). 
Truman desegregated the American military; establishing the President’s Committee 
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. See Exec. Order No. 
9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948). Eisenhower deployed the 101st Airborne 
Division to make sure that the Little Rock Nine got to Central High School, Providing 
Assistance for the Removal of an Obstruction of Justice within the State of Arkansas, 
Proclamation No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 25, 1957). And Johnson actually 
made the Civil Rights Act of 1964 happen. One might conclude that, at least from their 
perspectives, using a word like “nigger” did not make them racists or their actions 
discriminatory. 
 83. See Berg, supra note 62, at 71. Mr. Berg’s often-referenced description of Title 
VII’s legislative history provides significant insight to the contemporary and well-
disposed legal mind. Mr. Berg saw discrimination as, pardon the pun, a black and 
white issue. He apparently understood what “discrimination” meant so well that the 
word in isolation did not merit discussion. Where he discusses discrimination is in 
conjunction with the word “intentionally” to explain why “intentionally” was a 
superfluous addition to Title VII. “Discrimination is by its nature intentional. It 
involves both an action and a reason for the action. To discriminate ‘unintentionally’ 
on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin appears a contradiction in 
terms.” Id. In contrast, Mr. Berg dismisses as too remote the possibility that a 
subconscious intent to discriminate, that is submerged in the use of pejorative 
language, could fall within Title VII’s protections. Id. at n. 14. 
 84. The legislative history strongly supports a limited definition for 
“discrimination.” See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (H. R. 7152 “prohibits 
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Section 703(a) captures the responses to race Congress considered by 
making the anticipated reactions of the time unlawful. The anticipated 
reactions included rejecting an applicant because he or she was black,85 
or segregating a black person with other black people because of the 
belief that blacks could only be allowed to work certain kinds of jobs 
and/or the belief that white employees would not work in an integrated 
environment.86  
Another good example of the congressionally intended meaning 
of “discrimination” is the protection of seniority rights in Section 
703(h). The problem with seniority rights was their well-known 
relationship to the exclusion of black people from receiving all or some 
of their benefits on the sole basis of skin color.87 Title VII allowed 
these predations to go unpunished by being forward looking.88 Time 
began for “bona fide” seniority systems with Title VII’s enactment.89  
By virtue of the definition within Section 703(h), a seniority system 
was “bona fide” and could continue functioning where there was no 
“intention to discriminate.”90 “Discrimination,” therefore, meant no 
longer using race to exclude blacks from the benefits of seniority and 
no longer dispensing the benefits of seniority on the basis of race. 
 
                                                                                                       
and provides the means of terminating the most serious types of discrimination.”); H.R. 
REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 2 (1963) (“But this bill can and will commit our Nation to the 
elimination of many of the worst manifestations of racial prejudice.”). See also Frank 
Cloud Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. L. REV. 
417, 419-20 (1966) (arguing that Title VII will only address some of what Mr. 
Cooksey describes as “unreasonable discrimination” and concluding that “[t]he role of 
law in the area of equal employment opportunity is a limited one.”). 
 85. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964). 
 86. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964). Segregation was, of course, on the minds of the Nation and had been since 
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. In the employment context, a similar form of 
segregation permeated labor unions. Section 703(c)(1) and (2) are a direct response to 
this well-known phenomenon. 
 87. Professor Sovern’s 1962 article, supra note 76, is entirely dedicated to the 
resolution of race discrimination in unions. See also Herbert Hill, The New Judicial 
Perception of Employment Discrimination – Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 243, 250-54 (1972) (describing the extent of 
racial discrimination by and in unions). 
 88. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 89. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703(h), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 90. Id. 
62 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 
B.  Legislative History 
A comprehensive legislative history of Title VII is not necessary 
to a view of what I have called the conflicting evidence.91 Legislative 
history is only part of the story and need only describe the key events 
that led to the gestation and birth of Title VII. These key events are 
related to and work in concert with the background issues I described 
supra in Parts I and II.A. Together they reveal the Title VII that not 
only allows for Ash but promotes more decisions like Ash. 
 
1. Kennedy’s Title VII 
“The one thing Kennedy did not want was civil rights 
legislation.”92 As events at home and abroad began to force his hand, 
he began to turn himself to the issue. “Civil rights” for the Kennedy 
administration, however, did not include a federal law prohibiting 
private sector employment discrimination. The administration focused 
on public rights, like to right to vote, rather than private rights like the 
right to be free from discrimination in private employment.93 
On February 28, 1963, Kennedy’s first message to Congress on 
civil rights effectively established meritocracy as his guiding principle 
on voting rights and school desegregation legislation.94 Kennedy’s 
message included a section on employment, largely devoted to 
detailing the executive branch’s efforts in federal employment and 
                                                                                                       
 91. The best early efforts at a comprehensive catalogue specific to Title VII’s 
difficult legislative history are those of Mr. Vaas and Mr. Berg. See notes 47 and 62, 
respectively. See also WHALENS, supra note 45; Note, Employment Discrimination: 
State FEP Laws and the Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 608 (1965); Enforcement of Fair Employment, supra note 60; Note, 
Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834 (1969); and the volume long 
Developments in the Law publication of the Harvard Law Review, Employment 
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 109 
(1971). 
 92. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 15.  
 93. For example, Kennedy’s framing of civil rights as a moral issue in response to 
events in Birmingham, Alabama in the summer of 1963 related only to education, 
public accommodation, and voting. Kennedy’s vision of civil rights really never 
included protections from discrimination in private employment. See Report on Civil 
Rights, supra note 33. Although I agree with those, like Professor Trina Jones, who 
sees that anti-discrimination law is in peril generally, see Trina Jones, Anti-
Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 425-26 (2010), any reliance on the 
Kennedy legacy as a source for strong employment discrimination prohibitions is 
misplaced. 
 94. See 109 CONG. REC. 3,245-49 (1963). 
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contracting.95 Outside of the public sector, Kennedy’s vision of 
                                                                                                       
 95. Id. at 3,248. Kennedy was in the process of a two-pronged attack on the 
employment issue. See id. at 3,245-49. The first prong, via executive orders 
culminating in Executive Order 11246, meant to prevent the government from funding 
discriminatory employment practices. The second prong was to use the quasi-judicial 
powers of the NLRB to see that discrimination became an unfair labor practice. The 
scope of the Kennedy Administration’s activity on the second prong is not clear. He 
may have had the Hughes Tool case, 147 N.L.R.B. 166 (1964), in mind. That case 
established racial discrimination in union membership as an unfair labor practice for 
the first time. See id. 
Kennedy’s strategy might have achieved the most important employment 
discrimination goals of getting blacks in jobs. Freedom from employment 
discrimination as an unfair labor practice would have all of the benefits of a public 
right, including a federal agency to enforce the law. Practical economic benefits 
attended this philosophical benefit. Banking on the desirability of lucrative government 
contracts, compliance with executive orders would have put significant pressure on 
industry to cease discriminatory employment practices and perhaps to engage in what 
would have been, at the time, legal preferences in favor of blacks. To the degree the 
contractors were also unionized, a steady stream of successful unfair labor practice 
charges would put blacks in jobs and in line for better, more skilled, higher paying 
jobs. 
Kennedy’s strategy might have achieved all of this without serious risk to an omnibus 
civil rights law. He must have been aware of the rancor in the House over the recent 
attempts in 1962 and 1963 on H.R. 10144 and H.R. 405, respectively, to get a free 
standing federal fair employment practices bill out of committee. This knowledge 
could explain the absence of a strong federal fair employment practices title in his 
original proposal for omnibus civil rights legislation, which became H.R. 7152. It also 
explains his statements to the civil rights leadership after the March on Washington on 
August 28, 1963. Kennedy explained to the black leadership that Representative 
McCulloch told Kennedy that if he, McCulloch, wanted to defeat omnibus legislation, 
he would put in a fair employment practices title, vote for it, and watch it die in the 
house. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 26-27. McCulloch was a core member of the 
center position that ultimately allowed the Civil Rights Act to become law. See id at 
29-71. 
Additionally, the history of H.R. 10144 and H.R. 405 may have taught him that federal 
employment discrimination legislation was toxic to omnibus civil rights legislation. 
One of the problems was whether employment discrimination was a proper field for 
federal intervention. Opponents of federal action asserted federalism and “the force of 
public opinion” as solutions. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-570, at 2318 (1963). They claimed 
that federal legislation on the issue was, if not immoral, a counterproductive idea that 
would “tend[] to breed contempt for the law and a public apathy about moral values.” 
Id. Moreover, neither H.R. 10144 nor H.R. 405 provided for a court trial of 
discrimination claims. Opponents claimed that these bills endangered the fundamental 
right to a court trial. Id. The bills also put enforcement in the hands of a federal agency 
that mirrored the NLRB. Opponents did not want another quasi-judicial agency on a 
crusade and feared that “the accused . . . as a practical matter . . . must bear the burden 
of proving his freedom from guilt.” Id. at 2314. Had Kennedy’s employment 
discrimination strategy remained in place, rather than being supplanted by a strong 
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employment discrimination as a national problem focused on unions.96 
He envisioned using the NLRB as the way to reach private 
employment discrimination once the NLRB decided, under the 
prodding of the Department of Justice, that racial discrimination was 
an unfair labor practice.97 Kennedy “hope[d] that administrative action 
and litigation [would] make unnecessary the enactment of legislation 
with respect to union discrimination.”98 
Kennedy’s second address to Congress on civil rights on June 19, 
1963, fulfilled the nationally televised promise he made on June 11, 
1963, to send Congress omnibus civil rights legislation.99 Between the 
11th and the 19th, the administration’s early drafts of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1963 did not include any federal fair employment practices 
titles.100 The version of the administration’s bill that was submitted in 
the House as H.R. 7152 on June 20, 1963 was the first version that 
mentioned an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in its 
seventh title.101 The sole aim of that version of Title VII was the 
prevention of discrimination by government contractors and 
subcontractors.102 Kennedy believed that a strong fair employment 
practices component jeopardized the entire civil rights effort.103 
                                                                                                       
federal fair employment practices title in the omnibus legislation, there would have 
been little to attack and dismember under the guise of a bi-partisan compromise. 
 96. See 109 CONG. REC. 3,245-49 (1963). 
 97. Id. at 3,245. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Report on Civil Rights, supra note 33. 
 100. See Civil Rights Act of 1963 (June 13,1963),.http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-053-004.aspx. (last visited May 8, 2012). This draft 
included only five titles, none of which addressed employment discrimination. See id. 
Another version of the proposed legislation, with a penciled date of June 17, 1963, had 
six titles and no employment discrimination title. See id. 
 101. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1 (1963). 
 102. Id. at 35 (“It shall be the function of the Commission to prevent discrimination 
against employees or applicants for employment because of race, color, religion, or 
national origin by Government contractors and subcontractors, and by contractors and 
subcontractors participating in programs or activities in which direct or indirect 
financial assistance by the United States Government is provided . . . .”). 
 103. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 27. Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on October 15-16, 1963 is hard to 
square with the administration’s steady and deliberate avoidance of federal legislation 
on discrimination in private employment. By the time of those hearings, Subcommittee 
No. 5 had substituted Kennedy’s Title VII with a formidable title aimed exactly at 
discrimination in private employment. Attorney General Kennedy testified that “the 
President strongly endorsed Federal fair employment practices legislation applicable to 
both employers and unions.” Civil Rights Act of 1963: Hearing on H.R. 7152 Before 
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2. Replacing Kennedy’s Title VII 
Before October 1963, the House subcommittee responsible for 
H.R.7152 discarded the Kennedy administration’s proposed Title VII 
and replaced it with what had been H.R. 405.104  In 1963 H.R. 405 was 
the latest of a succession of failed attempts at federal fair employment 
practices legislation.105 Its predecessor from 1962 was H. R. 10144.106 
The story of the development of this fair employment practices 
legislation, outside of the context of omnibus civil rights legislation, 
foreshadows much of the debate that occurred over H.R. 7152 in the 
House and the Senate.107 And, if one can safely assume that the 
Kennedy administration was aware of this story, the discussion of these 
bills in the House Committee on Education and Labor explains 
Kennedy’s prescience of the potentially catastrophic impact potent 
federal fair employment practices legislation would have on passing an 
omnibus civil rights bill.108 
The Committee Report on H.R. 405, nevertheless, gives 
significant insight into what the legislators most likely thought of as 
“discrimination” in employment.109 One of the themes of the 
Committee Report matches Kennedy’s focus on unions as a source of 
the discrimination. Another theme, which went largely without 
comment elsewhere, was the psychology of separation.  These themes 
explain that the “discrimination” addressed in H.R. 405 was of two 
kinds. One form of discrimination was based on decisional reactions to 
readily identifiable immutable characteristics. H.R. 405 addressed this 
form of discrimination by making it unlawful to make adverse 
employment decisions based on observable immutable 
                                                                                                       
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2660 (1963). Attorney General Kennedy 
also made clear, however, that the administration was well aware that the potent Title 
VII contained in H.R. 7152 at that time could endanger the passage of the entire civil 
rights act. Id. at 2661. 
 104. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963) (“A Bill to Prohibit Discrimination in 
Employment in Certain Cases Because of Race, Religion, Color, National Origin, 
Ancestry or Age.” The short title was to have been the “Federal Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act.” See also Vaas, supra note 47, at 433 (“H.R. 405 is the nominal 
ancestor of Title VII.”); WHALENS, supra note 45, at 35. 
 105. Failed in the sense of dying in the House after having been successfully 
reported out of committee. See Vaas, supra note 62, at 433 n. 10, 434. 
 106. See id. at 433 n. 10; H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963). 
 107. See infra notes 109-48 and accompanying text. 
 108. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 26-27. 
 109. See infra note 105. 
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characteristics.110 The other form of discrimination the legislators had 
in mind occurred only after employment and it was based on the 
physical actions and mental attitude that accompanied segregation. 
H.R. 405 dealt with this form of discrimination by prohibiting the habit 
or practice of assuming that race or color was limiting; from continuing 
the segregation of blacks into menial, low paying work and/or actually 
physically segregating employees. The first version of H.R. 405 is 
otherwise noteworthy for its inclusion of age as a protected class and 
the only class subject to what became a powerful protection of union 
seniority against all classes protected by Title VII: “but no 
discrimination arising by reason of the operation of a bona fide 
seniority system shall be deemed an unlawful employment practice” 
based on age.111 
H.R. 405’s explosiveness came from its close resemblance to the 
NLRA in its key enforcement provision.112 Like the National Labor 
Relations Board, H.R. 405 created an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission with quasi-judicial powers.113 The Commission was 
“empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful 
employment practice.”114 These powers included, after a Commission 
hearing and a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
respondent had engaged in any unlawful employment practice, the 
ability to issue cease and desist orders “and to take such affirmative 
action, including reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without 
back pay . . . .”115 In this version of H.R. 405, however, there was no 
effort to separate the EEOC’s investigative and prosecutorial functions 
from its judicial functions.116 Once an unlawful employment practice 
charge was filed, the EEOC took ownership of the charge.117 There was 
no provision for a claimant under H.R. 405 to seek direct judicial 
intervention.118 Any dispute over a Commission decision could be 
                                                                                                       
 110. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2300 (1963). 
 111. See id. at § 6(a) (“Discrimination Because of Age.”). 
 112. See id. at 2314 (1963) (“We must vigorously object to the administrative 
procedure which has been incorporated in this bill by the majority members of the 
committee.”); Berg, supra note 62, at 65; Vaas, supra note 47, at 436-37. 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, §§ 8 and 9 (1963). 
 114. Id. at § 9(a). 
 115. Id. at § 9(j). 
 116. Id. at §§ 9(a) – (j). 
 117. Id. at § 9(b). 
 118. Only the Commission could petition a United States Court of Appeals for 
enforcement of any Commission-issued cease and desist order. Id. at § 10(a). “Any 
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reviewed in a United States Circuit Court of Appeals – where the 
factual findings of the Commission, if supported by substantial 
evidence, would have conclusive effect.119 In the context of the debate 
over public and private rights, the initial version of H.R. 405 was as 
close to elevating employment discrimination to the rank of public 
rights as any legislation in the Civil Rights Era.120 
On July 22, 1963, the House Committee on Education and Labor 
reported out the “Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963.”121 This 
version of H. R. 405, with minor modifications, replaced Kennedy’s 
proposed Title VII in H. R. 7152.122 By July 1963, the committee 
deleted age as a protected class123 and added bona fide occupational 
qualifications (“BFOQs”) as a narrow exception for occupational 
qualifications based on religion and national origin.124 The only other 
major changes related to the structure of the EEOC as the enforcer of 
equal employment opportunity and the ability of an employer to avoid 
liability. 
In response to criticism about making the EEOC the investigator, 
prosecutor and judge, H. R. 405 now described the Commission as a 
“vessel” for a Board and an Office of the Administrator.125 The Board 
housed the judicial functions.126 The Administrator housed the 
investigative and prosecutorial functions.127 In a related addition, where 
the Administrator failed to prosecute a charge, a charging party could 
apply to a federal court to compel the Administrator to issue and 
                                                                                                       
person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission” could use the same avenue for 
relief from a Commission determination. Id. at § 10(h). 
 119. Id. at § 10(d). This was the same procedure used in cases under the NLRA. See 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 120. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 121. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2300 (1963). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. Age as a basis for employment discrimination legislation was consigned 
to the Secretary of Labor for study. Congress retained this provision in Title VII and 
ultimately handled age discrimination in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967. 
 124. Id. at 2307. 
 125. “The major purpose of this functional division within the Commission is to 
separate to the greatest degree feasible the functions of ‘prosecutor’ and ‘judge’.” Id. at 
2304. 
 126. “The Board is primarily a quasi-judicial body with power to hear and determine 
complaints and issue lawful and appropriate orders.” Id. at 2303. 
 127. “The Office of the Administrator, headed by the Administrator, is the body 
responsible for the continuing implementation of the act in its entirety. Id. at 2303-04. 
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prosecute a charge.128 There was still no mechanism allowing or 
requiring an individual charging party to seek judicial relief on his 
own. The Committee explained the need to house the enforcement of 
federal employment discrimination law in a federal agency as 
consistent with existing federal and state fair employment practices 
agencies.129 Moreover, a “one–stop shop” for employment 
discrimination held the most important merit of speed. 
Justice delayed, is justice denied,” applies especially with 
great force in this area. Undue delay in achieving a final 
decision could make the ultimate result a pyrrhic victory. 
In addition to speed, this procedure would reduce costs for 
parties, allow for greater informality and flexibility, 
provide greater uniformity of result within a shorter 
period, and tend toward the development and contribution 
of expertise in the area, be conducive to continuing 
supervision of compliance, create greater motivation to 
reach informal agreements, and establish unified 
implementation of a truly national policy.130 
In keeping with the limited definition of “discrimination” and 
meritocracy as the leitmotif of the Era, the Committee also explained 
that H.R. 405’s operative provisions protect individuals rather than 
groups, “and [are] not intended to discriminate in favor of or against 
individual members of any group.”131 The distinctions Congressmen 
made here are noteworthy. The focus on the individual comports with 
meritocracy; “encourag[ing] the consideration of individuals for 
employment based upon merit, capability, competence, effort, and 
other factors not related to an individual’s race”.132 The expression of 
meritocracy in H.R. 405 therefore abandoned groups as a suspect class. 
These Congressmen also rejected the notion of disparate impact. The 
Committee affirmed that disproportional representation133 of any kind 
                                                                                                       
 128. “Where the Administrator fails or refuses to issue a complaint within a 
reasonable time, the person filing the charge may petition a Federal court to require the 
Administrator to issue such a complaint. This is intended to inhibit unjustifiable delay 
or rejection of remedial action.” Id. at 2304. 
 129. “This is the procedural pattern followed by the vast majority of State [sic] fair 
employment practice laws, as well as a traditional practice among many independent 
federal agencies.” Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. “Nothing in the act is intended to allow charges to be brought based upon a 
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could not support a charge of discrimination under H.R. 405.134 
Moreover, the Committee’s discussion of “[g]eneral rules as to 
percentages and quotas” to establish proportional representation 
demonstrates consideration and rejection of affirmative action of any 
kind.135 The Commission could, however consider disproportionate 
representation as background evidence in any proceeding.136 
Also consistent with the idea of a narrow definition of 
“discrimination” and the kind of behavior that could result in liability; 
H.R. 405 addressed the issue of defenses against charges of 
employment discrimination. Initially, H.R. 405 only described the 
result of a finding that discrimination occurred without consideration 
of the impact on an award of relief if any adverse employment action 
was explained by any reason other than a proscribed characteristic.137 
This could have become an any taint standard which acknowledged the 
reality that multiple factors can influence any decision, but cause the 
decision to be irretrievably tainted by the presence of a proscribed 
characteristic.138 
This version of H.R. 405 is the law the majority of the Committee 
favored, but it would be error to call it the pivot139 position from which 
                                                                                                       
disproportionate representation of members of any race, religion, color, national origin, 
or ancestry within any business enterprise or labor organization.” Id. 
 134. “General rules as to percentages, quotas, or other proportional representation 
shall not be the basis of charges brought under this act.” Id. 
 135. Id. I must acknowledge that the Committee’s language is somewhat ambiguous. 
By stating that “General rules as to percentages, quotas, or other proportional 
representation shall not be the basis of charges brought under this act[,]” the 
Committee may have suggested that such rules might be established and would not 
violate the law. In that case, the Committee intended to permit affirmative action under 
H.R. 405. This conclusion is probably not what the Committee intended. It is 
completely inconsistent with the meritocracy discussion surrounding it. None of the 
additional, supporting, minority, or supplemental view in H.R. Rep. 570 mentions 
affirmative action, which they surely would have done in the face of a proposal that 
jobs could legally be set aside for blacks because of disproportionate employment. 
Finally, such an idea is inconsistent with the fact that the remedies of H.R. 405 were 
meant to be entirely prospective. 
 136. Id. at 2305. 
 137. See id. at § 9(j).   
 138. See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII 
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 296 (1982) (any “‘taint’ 
standard of causation . . . would make unlawful a decision based even in part on a 
racial motive.”). 
 139. I have adopted the terms “pivot” and “pivot legislators” from Professors 
Rodriguez and Weingast who use it to describe the legislators without whom the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 could not have passed. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 30, at 
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H.R. 405 would survive intact as the law of the land. Instead, it 
represents one extremity of the debate140 which, as I argue in the 
following sections, represented an untenable perspective. The other 
equally untenable perspective condemned federal employment 
discrimination law outright.141 Although untenable, the anti-
employment discrimination argument resonated in certain respects. It 
captured parts of the Civil Rights Era meritocracy, in pointing out the 
financial and social hardships on employers and workers. Those 
against a powerful federal law hinted at issues of wealth redistribution 
and federalism in the right to make employment decisions on any basis 
without cost.142 It also more directly faced the specter of which existing 
rights would have to be limited in favor of eradicating employment 
discrimination.143 These arguments resonated strongly with the pivot 
legislators which an omnibus civil rights package would require for 
passage. For that reason, the EEOC envisioned in H.R. 405 merits 
additional discussion. 
An EEOC that functioned like the NLRB was rejected in the 1962 
iteration of an equal employment opportunity law in H.R. 10144 for 
                                                                                                       
1436. The term also distinguishes “pivot legislators” from legislators Professors 
Rodriguez and Weingast describe as “ardent supporters” in their meticulous discussion 
of where courts should focus in legislative history to find the best source of the actual 
intent of the legislators. Professors Rodriguez and Weingast argue that for purposes of 
consistent statutory interpretation courts should give the statements of the pivot 
legislators the most weight because “. . . they have the strongest incentives to 
communicate reliably the act’s meaning . . .” Id. at 1448. 
 140. This extremity of the debate is defined by giving primacy to equal employment 
opportunity. “There is no more crucial right that the right of equal opportunity to work 
for a living and to acquire the material blessings of life for self and family.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 88-570, at 2317 (1963). 
 141. See id. In Commenting on H. R. 405 in its form as Title VII to H. R. 7152, 
Representative Meader thought Title VII an “ill-devised limitation upon the area of 
discretion and decision-making of both American business and American workers[,]” 
and for that reason among others opined that Title VII be deleted from the Civil Rights 
Act. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 57 (1963). Extreme conservatives paraded hot 
button issues like having to choose a “Negro” despite personal preferences against 
“Negros,” and hiring by quota to achieve numerical racial balance. They went on to 
predict a virtual social Armageddon: “If this title of this legislation becomes a statute, 
we predict that it will be as bitterly resented and equally as abortive as was the 18th 
Amendment [prohibition], and what it will do to the political equilibrium, the social 
tranquility, and the economic stability of the American society, no one can predict.” Id. 
at 111. 
 142. See id. at 57-58. 
 143. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2302 (1963). 
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two reasons.144 First, it was claimed that an agency with quasi–judicial 
power violated the American principal that a “fair trial” could only be 
achieved in a court of law.145 Second, it was observed that the state fair 
employment practices agencies, many of which resembled the NLRB 
in their enforcement powers, achieved more success in conciliation 
efforts than through hearings and cease and desist orders.146 These 
pivot legislators, supporters of H. R. 405 in the Committee on 
Education and Labor, believed: 
Discrimination in employment on the basis of race, 
religion, color, national origin or ancestry is contrary to 
our national ideals and our national interest. But we do not 
act very wisely if we destroy one fundamental right in our 
zeal to protect another. * * * We believe it would be a 
serious mistake if this legislation were to deny the right of 
trial in a court of law, and we believe that such a denial 
could only serve to undermine and weaken the moral force 
of this legislation and public acceptance of it.147 
Given the source of these sentiments and their underlying 
criticism of the way the NLRB functioned, in addition to the fact that 
H.R. 405’s predecessor, H.R. 10144, purposefully abandoned the 
NLRB model, one can comfortably conclude that H.R. 405 appeared as 
Title VIII in H.R. 7152 in anticipation of being traded away to secure 
the Act’s passage.148 
                                                                                                       
 144. Id. at 16. 
 145. “The historic safeguard of trial before an impartial judiciary would be 
abandoned in this bill by the majority in favor of hearings before a newly created 
NLRB-type administrative tribunal, with only a limited right of review in a court of 
appeals. It is unfortunate that the committee in its zeal to protect one civil right has 
seen fit, unnecessarily, to cast aside other fundamental and well-established rights 
which are at least of equal importance.” Id. at 15. “We regard the modern development 
of trial by administrative tribunal as a threat to the liberties of every citizen. It is a 
reactionary device in the truest sense of that word.” Id. at 20. 
 146. Id. at 16. 
 147. Id. at 17. 
 148. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 37. The legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 in its entirety is often told as a tale of great success because of the overall 
minimal impact of the Senate compromise on voting rights, public accommodations, 
and school desegregation relative to what happened to Title VII. See WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 20 (3d ed. 2001) (“Although the Democrats had allowed 
Dirksen to make changes to the bill’s language, so that he could claim to have 
significantly rewritten the bill, virtually all of the changes were cosmetic . . . not 
weakening the substantive protections.”). Title VII viewed individually felt the brunt of 
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3. Compromising Title VII 
As H.R. 7152 worked its way through the House Judiciary 
Committee, to the full House, then to the Senate—where it faced the 
longest filibuster in history—and then through the “leadership 
compromise;” Title VII became fully compromised. Compromised in 
the sense of its components being traded away in favor of fulfilling the 
Nation’s foundation promise of equality; a promise which found 
substance in voting rights, public accommodations, and school 
desegregation. The right to be free from discrimination in employment 
was not comparable to these important problems. Despite the fact that 
the famous “March on Washington” in August 1963 was actually 
organized as a “March for Jobs and Freedom,”149 employment 
discrimination never became a first class problem in the legislature. 
Title VII was also compromised in the sense that it would 
ultimately preserve rather than eradicate the status quo.  Within the 
universe, as they perceived it, the Members of the House Committee 
on Labor and Employment structured H.R. 405 to take on the harsh 
reality of black joblessness and imprisonment in low paying menial 
work.150 When these Congressmen spoke about the symbiotic 
relationship between earning a living, having a reason to vote, having 
the ability to enjoy public accommodations and being motivated to 
succeed in school, they had H. R. 405 as a pledge of sincerity.151 Once 
the deal-making began, and others spoke these words, the obfuscation 
is chilling. 
In the House Judiciary Committee, the same people who said: 
The right to vote . . . does not have much meaning on an 
empty stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in 
education is lacking if gainful employment is closed to the 
                                                                                                       
the compromise. Attorney General Kennedy acknowledged as much: “I recognize that 
there are some experienced Members of Congress who feel that the inclusion of this 
provision in the omnibus bill could make it difficult to secure a rule from the Rules 
Committee and could even jeopardize ultimate passage of the omnibus bill.” Civil 
Rights Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. 2660 
(1963). At the same time, the Attorney General hinted that the administration was not 
behind fair employment practices legislation that endangered an omnibus civil rights 
bill. Id. More openly he hinted that fair employment practices be severed from H. R. 
7152 as an entirely separate goal. Id. 
 149. Garrow, supra note 73, at 284. 
 150. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, at 2301 (1963).  
 151. Id. 
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graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is a 
shallow victory where one’s pockets are empty.152 
also said: 
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine 
its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality 
with mathematical certainty. In this regard, nothing in this 
title permits a person to demand employment. Of greater 
importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its 
continued existence if it seeks to impose forced racial 
balance upon employers and labor unions. Similarly, 
management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be 
left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal 
affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be 
interfered with except to the limited extent that correction 
is required in discrimination practices153 
 
This statement represented the pivot position on employment 
discrimination; the “consensus of the civil rights proponents” in the 
House.154 Events in the Senate merely advanced the effort to leave 
“management prerogatives and union freedoms . . . undisturbed to the 
greatest extent possible.”155 
 
a. Elimination of an NLRB-style EEOC 
The House Judiciary Committee did most of the work of 
eliminating an NLRB-style EEOC from Title VII. By the time H.R. 
7152 was reported out of that committee, the EEOC had ceased to be a 
quasi–judicial entity with broad enforcement powers.156  The pivotal 
legislators did not want a crusading quasi-judicial agency to eradicate 
employment discrimination.157  The Judiciary Committee stripped out 
                                                                                                       
 152. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 26 (1963). 
 153. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
 154. Vaas, supra note 47, at 437. 
 155. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). 
 156. Had Kennedy’s proposed Title VII remained in place in H. R. 7152, there 
would have been little to attack and dismember under the guise of a bi-partisan 
compromise. The opportunity presented itself when H. R. 405 took the place of Title 
VII. Kennedy’s Title VII looked weak on employment discrimination. See WHALENS, 
supra note 45, at 26. Those, who were strong on employment discrimination, the 
leadership of the civil rights movement, had allies with sufficient conviction and ability 
to put H.R. 405 into H. R. 7152. Id. at 36-7. 
 157. Vaas, supra note 47, at 450. 
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the judicial function entirely.158 All that remained was the 
Commission’s ability to seek judicial relief for discrimination when 
conciliation failed.159 During the “leadership compromise” phase of 
H.R. 7152’s legislative history, the Senate completed the EEOC’s 
emasculation.160 The Commission had no right to seek judicial relief 
for claims of disparate treatment.161 These changes represented the 
successful resonance of the “right to a fair trial” argument. As a policy 
choice, the “right to a fair trial,” a phrase pregnant with reactionary 
potential, was more important than the right to be free from 
employment discrimination.162 So, in Title VII’s text and in effect, the 
EEOC’s primary function would be conciliation not vindication.163  
 
b. Protecting the Labor-Management Complex 
 Seniority rights represented another area where Congress could 
secure the status quo contrary to Kennedy’s envisioned fair 
employment practices plan.164  The Senate inserted protections for bona 
                                                                                                       
 158. WHALENS, supra note 45, at 58. 
 159. Vaas, supra note 47, at 436. 
 160. Berg, supra note 62, at 66-7. 
 161. Id. 
 162. “A substantial number of the committee members . . . preferred that the ultimate 
determination of discrimination rest with the Federal Judiciary. Through this 
requirement, we believe that the employer or labor union will have a fairer forum to 
establish innocence since a trial de novo is required in district court proceedings . . . .” 
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). 
 163.  
It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its activities to 
correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical certainty. In 
this regard, nothing in this title permits a person to demand employment. 
Of greater importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its continued 
existence if it seeks to impose forced racial balance upon employers and 
labor unions. 
1964 U. S. C. C. A. N. at 2516. See also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., INTRODUCTION, 
7 B. C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 413 (1966). Roosevelt, the first chairman of the EEOC, 
saw that Title VII on its face was lacking when he described the EEOC’s initial focus 
as encouraging “business [to] go beyond the letter of the law in order to carry out the 
spirit of the law.” Id. at 413-14. Chairman Roosevelt hoped that “persuasive and 
aggressive promotion of affirmative action . . .” would fill the gaps in the letter of the 
law. Id. Ironically, the Court would close this “affirmative action” gap in United Steele 
Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979), by finding that voluntary 
affirmative action (under certain circumstances) did not violate Title VII. 
164.  The plan President Kennedy outlined in his first message to Congress isolated 
labor for special treatment. The President wanted to attack discrimination in the labor-
management complex. For a view of the scope and variety of the discrimination, see 
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fide seniority systems in H.R. 7152.165 This language helped advance 
that goal of preserving the status quo by protecting employers and 
unions from the financial repercussions of the very specific harm 
historical discrimination wrought on blacks in crafts and trades.166 
The protections contained in this section of Title VII raise three 
essential points. First, the act of insulating the known historical harms 
from claims of discrimination gave substance to the pivot position on 
the purpose of Title VII. What better place to begin giving meaning to 
the directive that “management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to 
be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible”167 than to gift the 
history of those prerogatives and freedoms with a blanket pardon? The 
second point consist of eliminating any risk of a “windfall” wealth 
redistribution had Title VII allowed blacks to attack the obvious and 
                                                                                                       
generally Sovern, supra note 76, at 1.  
(Negro workers are still disproportionately concentrated in the ranks of 
the unskilled and semiskilled in both private and public employment. 
They are also disproportionately represented among the unemployed 
because their concentration in unskilled and semiskilled jobs . . . and 
because Negro workers often have relatively low seniority.) (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 165. Vaas, supra note 47, at 449. Professors Rodriguez and Weingast concluded that 
the primary work of the pivotal legislators in the Senate was to blunt the impact of 
Title VII on the north where their constituencies dominated job opportunity, both as 
management and labor, and discrimination was de facto rather than de jure. Rodriguez 
& Weingast, supra note 30, at 1471-72; 1487 (“Taken as a whole these amendments 
were designed to blunt the impact of the bill on the North and lower the perceived cost 
of the Act to Republican constituents.”). 
 166. The connection between creating a safe harbor for “bona fide seniority systems” 
and perpetuating an employment ghetto for blacks in unionized settings before Title 
VII became operational in 1965 escaped the notice of the early legislative historians, 
see Berg, supra note 62, at 73-74, and the voice of Title VII in the Senate, Hubert 
Humphrey. To both of them the first part of 703(h) only meant that disparities in pay 
and/or other terms and conditions of employment can be, and are, acceptable under 
bona fide seniority or merit systems, so long as they aren’t used as an indirect means of 
discrimination. Humphrey’s example was that an employer with two plants, one 
predominately black and one predominately white, could have better pay and 
conditions at one of the plants, so long as the employer did not intend to discriminate. 
110 CONG. REC. 12,297 (1964). This ignores the fact that the difference was based on 
intentional discrimination in the first place, that an employer and a union would escape 
all liability for the impact of that intentional discrimination, and that an employer could 
only be liable after 1965 if the employer actively continued to discriminate. Given the 
truly imbedded nature of the harm that had already been done, there really was no 
motivation for an employer or union to take an active role – the impact of the harm was 
self-perpetuating. 
 167. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). 
76 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 
rich target presented by the historical depredations practiced between 
union and management.168 Such a scenario could take on nightmarish 
qualities where courts branded the “haves” as personally responsible 
for administering a system where they were unjustly enriched by the 
purposeful exclusion of the “have nots” and the courts compelled the 
“haves” to divest themselves of finite, albeit ill-gotten, resources.169 
The third point is that the central theme of the Civil Rights Era 
effectively supplied Congress with the rationale for avoiding the 
nightmare scenario. “Unearned” “windfalls” are by definition outside 
                                                                                                       
 168. What I call depredations were so notorious that they were President Kennedy’s 
starting points in attacking employment discrimination, figured prominently in 
Committee discussions of the need for federal fair employment practices legislation, 
see H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 at 2(1963), and caught scholarly attention, see Sovern, supra 
note 76. 
 169. Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination And The Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1260 (1967). This Note, like all the scholarship analyzing Title VII in the years 
immediately after its passage, struggles with the fact of Title VII’s limited protections 
and its entirely prospective view. Id. at 1262. This Note is unique in specifically 
addressing the problems arising from Title VII’s specific protections of bona fide 
seniority systems which on their face insulate historical discrimination from Title VII’s 
reach. Id. at 1263-1266. Arguing that in order to achieve Title VII’s purpose (“a desire 
to eliminate the economic losses to the Negro and to the nation caused by racial 
discrimination in employment”), the Note’s author urges courts to adopt a “rightful 
place” approach to the issue of seniority discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 1273-
1274. The “ ‘rightful place’ approach holds that the continued maintenance of the 
relative competitive disadvantage imposed on Negroes by the past operation of a 
discriminatory system violates Title VII . . .” Id. at 1268. Because Title VII outlaws the 
segregation of jobs by race, “the ‘rightful place’ approach would allow an incumbent 
Negro to bid for openings in ‘white’ jobs of comparable to those held by whites of 
equal tenure, on the basis of his full length of service with the employer.” Id. The 
“rightful place” approach was not vulnerable to a challenge of being retroactive or 
requiring employers to take the impermissible step of discriminating in favor of blacks. 
Moreover, “the ‘rightful place’ remedy does not deprive white workers of the benefits 
of discrimination which have accrued to them in the past . . .” Id. at 1274 (italics 
added). 
The significance of this Note is that the “rightful place” approach became the answer to 
the question posed in the seminal decision Quarles v. Philip Morris Inc., 279 F.Supp. 
505 (E.D. Va 1968): “Are present consequences of past discrimination covered by 
[Title VII]?” Id. at 510 (“A perceptive analysis of the problem and its solution, upon 
which the court has freely drawn, may be found in Note, Title VII, Seniority 
Discrimination And The Incumbent Negro, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1260 (1967).”) The 
Quarles decision is cited with approval in Griggs, and has been credited with being the 
source of the Court’s creation of the disparate impact theory of recovery. Robert 
Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death and Resurrection of the 
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 431, 444-
446 (2005). 
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of the parameters of meritocracy. To take from whites and give to 
blacks because of historical racial discrimination was 
incomprehensible in a new society suddenly struck “colorblind.” 
 
c. Protecting an Employer’s Right to Test 
Intelligence testing of job candidates did not arise as an issue 
until H. R. 7152 arrived in the Senate.170 The trigger for Congress to 
protect testing in Title VII came from an Illinois state fair employment 
practices decision.171 In Myart v. Motorola, Inc.,172 Myart alleged that 
Motorola did not hire him because he was black.173 One of Motorola’s 
defenses was it did not hire Myart because he failed Motorola’s Test 
No. 10, a general intelligence test.174 Motorola did not produce Myart’s 
actual test or the Motorola employee who administered Myart’s test.175 
Myart testified that he had passed Test No. 10. Motorola produced the 
test’s author,176 who testified that it was the shortest test he knew of to 
test verbal comprehension and ability to understand instructions.177 
The hearing officer, finding for Myart, enjoined Motorola from 
using Test No. 10. According to the hearing officer, Test No. 10 was 
obsolete and had the effect of disadvantaging minority applicants 
regardless of intent.178 Test No. 10’s “norm was derived from 
standardization on advantaged groups. Studies in inequalities and 
environmental factors since the publication of test No. 10 [in 1949] 
have been made with careful equating of such background factors. . . . 
[T]his test does not lend itself to equal opportunity to qualify for the 
hitherto culturally deprived and the disadvantaged groups.”179 In 
addition to ordering Motorola to cease and desist from using Test No. 
10, the hearing officer ordered that, should the company replace the 
test, any replacement “shall reflect and equate inequalities and 
environmental factors among the disadvantaged and culturally 
                                                                                                       
 170. See Vaas, supra note 47, at 449. 
 171. See Berg, supra note 62, at 74. 
 172. 110 CONG. REC. 5,662-64 (1964). 
 173. Id. at 5,662. 
 174. Id. at 5,663. 
 175. Id. 
 176. “Dr. Shurrager developed a series of test for [Motorola, including Test No. 10,] 
including tests of four different kinds of special relations and ability; and he regularly 
supplies these tests to [Motorola] for a fee . . . .” Id. 
 177. Id. at 5,664. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
78 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2 
deprived groups.”180 The hearing officer also ordered Motorola to 
employ Myart.181 
Seen as a declaration that facially neutral tests cannot be used to 
reject “disadvantaged and culturally deprived groups” unless the tests 
account for “inequalities and environmental factors,” the hearing 
officer’s decision in Myart and the Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Company are effectively identical.182 Imbedded in the hearing 
officer’s pronouncements of cultural deprivation and inequalities lay 
the Griggs Court’s reasoning that the educational, and therefore 
occupational, disparities caused by segregation could not be allowed to 
be frozen in time by a facially neutral test that did not really test a 
person’s ability to do a job, but instead tested the person himself.183 
Fully aware of, Myart, Congress could have signaled its intent to allow 
for the Griggs result by either remaining silent or by enacting a section 
that prohibited testing on any other basis than an applicant or 
employee’s ability to perform a specific job.184 
Congress neither remained silent on testing nor prohibited the 
kind of general intelligence testing for the group-wide discriminatory 
                                                                                                       
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. Myart’s compensatory demand was for employment, with back-pay, and 
seniority from the date of his application. Id. at 5,662. 
 182. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). In 1971, the Griggs Court 
created the disparate impact theory of recovery. See Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: 
A Brief Look at the Birth, Death and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of 
Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 434 (2005). Griggs is also 
significant for addressing the issue of the need for job tests and employment criteria to 
be related to the actual job in question. “The touchstone is business necessity. If an 
employment practice, which operates to exclude Negroes, cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.” Griggs, 401 U. S. at 431. This 
holding responded to Duke Power Company’s argument that Title VII specifically 
authorized the use of professionally developed ability tests in Section 703(h). For this 
holding, the Court relied on a combination of legislative history and the EEOC’s 
interpretive guidelines to demonstrate the need for the test to relate to ability to 
perform a specific job. To hold otherwise would allow a professionally developed test 
to mask discrimination. “What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and 
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of 
job performance.” Id. at 433–36. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Rodriguez & Weingast supra note 30, at 1504-08 (discussing the 
congressional response to Myart and the Court’s decision in Griggs). Note that 
Congress was also fully aware of the purposeful discrimination of similar “literacy 
tests” in the voting rights context and significantly circumscribed the use of such tests 
in Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with an eye to their eventual eradication. 
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impact identified in Myart.185 Congress specifically acted to make sure 
that the Myart result could not happen under Title VII.186  The Senate 
leadership accepted the Tower Amendment to Title VII and the 
following language ultimately appeared in Section 703(h): “nor shall it 
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act 
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided 
that such test is not designed, intended or used to discriminate . . . .”187  
In 1964 Congress could not have known that in 1971 the Court would, 
despite this language, reach the Myart result; a result that Congress 
clearly and specifically intended to bar. Congress wanted management 
prerogatives, including the giving of employment tests, to remain in 
place. The clarity of the legislative intent on the issue made the Court’s 
Griggs decision a usurpation of fundamental democratic principles and 
therefore fundamentally illegitimate.188 
Under the reasoning of Myart, almost all contemporary 
employment testing would allow for a finding of an unlawful 
employment practice because of the obviously ubiquitous design defect 
of failing to account for the nationwide impacts of segregation on 
education. Given the extreme likelihood of the design defect, 
discrimination was built into the result of any employment aptitude 
test. An employer taking action on the test result would necessarily be 
                                                                                                       
 185. See 110 CONG. REC. 5,664 (1964). 
 186. See Berg, supra note 62, at 74. 
 187. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 188. The fact that Congress later legitimized Griggs in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
does not alleviate the concerns about the Court’s political behavior. The Court was 
wrong to create disparate impact because the entire tenor of the legislative history 
shows that Congress considered that segregation had seriously impaired blacks as a 
group and decided to leave them impaired. “Nothing in the act is intended to allow 
charges to be brought based upon a disproportionate representation . . . .”. H.R. REP. 
NO. 88-570, at 2304 (1963). The demonstration of intent on testing is even stronger. 
Not only was the legislature aware of the issue, it specifically responded to that 
awareness by adding Section 703(h) to Title VII to keep general intelligence testing in 
place without regard to whether the test accounted for historical “disadvantage” and 
without regard to the relationship between the test and any specific job function. By 
overriding Congress’ will on these issues, the Court created a false impression of Title 
VII that we have yet to shed. Moreover, the Court creates a false impression of 
reliability when it acts politically and claims the touchstones of democratic process as 
justification. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27, at 348 (“A review of the 
Court’s discrimination doctrine indicates that the Court acted like a political branch . . . 
. Those who have analyzed the political branches’ civil rights enforcement efforts have 
generally concluded that the federal government lacked any solid commitment to racial 
equality . . . .”). 
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taking action to discriminate. Such a dramatic expansion of the 
compass of “discrimination” logically added the real and undesirable 
consequence of companies like Motorola being ordered to give jobs to 
people like Myart along with back-pay and/or back-dated seniority. 
The Tower amendment going largely unremarked189 can be 
explained by the notion that if Title VII guaranteed anything, it only 
guaranteed the equal opportunity to compete, regardless of history, 
from a starting line drawn in 1963.190 Thus, this exchange between 
Senator Dirksen, who had filed objections, and Senator Clark, one of 
the leading Democrats tasked with the passage of the omnibus civil 
rights legislation: 
Objection: Under the bill, employers will no longer be able 
to hire or promote on the basis of merit and performance. 
Answer: Nothing in the bill will interfere with merit hiring 
or merit promotion. The bill simply eliminates 
consideration of color from the decision to hire or 
promote.191 
From this perspective, testing embodies the spirit of equality and 
individual merit that animated the Civil Rights Movement.192 From a 
different perspective, testing, like a flat tax, is at best regressive in an 
economy where segregation prevented “have nots” from accumulating 
the educational and experiential capital to survive the imposition of the 
tax.193 From either perspective the employer’s ability to test was an 
                                                                                                       
 189. Compare Berg, supra note 62, at 74, who apparently saw the Tower amendment 
as largely irrelevant (“Since the amendment did not effect a change in the previous 
meaning of the title, no negative implication may be drawn from the reference to a 
‘professionally developed ability test.’”), with Vaas, supra note 47, at 449, who 
perceived what the logic of Myart portended (“The amendment is limited to an 
employer’s use of such tests. Does this leave to door open for the EEOC or a court to 
hold that use of such a test by an employment agency . . . is an unfair employment 
practice if it results in “de facto discrimination,” and the user knows or should have 
know that this would be the result?”). 
 190. See supra note 33 (President Kennedy’s announcement that America would 
become a colorblind society).  
 191. 110 CONG. REC. 7,218 (1964). 
 192. See supra note 31. 
 193. This is the position the Court established in Griggs and Congress confirmed by 
formally putting disparate impact into Title VII with the 1991 civil rights act 
amendments in response to the Wards Cove Court’s attempt to turn back the clock on 
Griggs. Morally, the Griggs court was right and Congress was equally right to formally 
install disparate impact in Title VII. Nevertheless, I argue that the position staked out 
by the centrists on Title VII intended testing, in partnership with the other factors I 
describe, to help maintain the status quo. If, as the Griggs Court opined, Congress did 
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unobjectionable part of existing management prerogatives,194 which 
“expressly protects the employer’s right to insist that any prospective 
applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job 
qualifications.”195 
d. No Quotas 
As part of Title VII’s compromise, the fact the federal law 
rejected any requirement to adjust for racial imbalance, to hire by quota 
or to specifically set aside opportunities for training and employment 
comes as no surprise. The absence of such provisions in Title VII is 
consistent with meritocracy. At bottom, however, this theme 
harmonizes well with the goals of those desirous of protecting the 
rights and interests of the majority. Nothing could or would result in 
more discord for civil rights proponents or opponents than to take 
limited resources from one group and give those resources to another 
group because of race. Section 703(j) embodies these concepts.196 
Section 703(j) also embodies the Nation’s rejection of atonement 
for slavery and segregation. Slavery and segregation, their practical 
impacts, ingrained behaviors and, perceptions were the reason for 
racial imbalance in employment.197 This very imbalance caused the 
legislators to comment on the need for Title VII.198 Yet, there was no 
legislative movement for a direct correction of these imbalances in the 
private sector.199 Moreover, there was a worrisome persistent call for 
reassurance that Title VII could not be a remedy for the observed 
imbalances, or by logical extension, an apology for the causes of the 
imbalances.200 
                                                                                                       
not intend to “freeze” black in place, they intended no more than a glacial pace for 
progress in employment discrimination consistent with the imperative to preserve 
existing management prerogatives and union freedoms. 
 194. Berg, supra note 62, at 74-75 (“Since the amendment did not effect a change in 
the previous meaning of the title, no negative implication may be drawn from the 
reference to a ‘professionally developed ability test.’ The issue in any case where the 
use of any ability test is questioned is not whether the test is professionally developed . 
. . but whether it is used in good faith or with intent to discriminate.”). 
 195. Berg, supra note 62, at 74, quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7,026 (1964). 
 196. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(j), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 197. Roosevelt, at, supra note 163, at 414 (“There will be no social peace unless we 
right ancient wrongs. That requires us to undo the damage done by 250 years of 
slavery and 100 years of segregation.”). 
 198. See supra note 152. 
 199. No iteration of Title VII provided for quotas or hiring to racial balance. 
 200. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963); Civil Rights Act of 1963: Hearing on H.R. 
7152 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2660 (1963). 
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Whether one chooses to view Section 703(j) as imbedding 
meritocracy in Title VII, its practical effect reinforced the status quo of 
racial imbalance.201 Even if the idea of “racial balance” only occurred 
to employers and labor organizations because of Section 703(j), that 
section assured them that they could continue with their existing 
intentionally racially imbalanced work force. Status quo, however, to 
have its complete meaning must describe the behavior, mind-set and 
beliefs that cause the imbalance as well as the resulting imbalance. Just 
as 703(j) protects the result, so also it creates a safe haven for the truth 
that segregation was and continues to be a social norm and that people 
take as much “freedom” as they can to make sure they are not 
associating with people they do not like even if the reasons for the 
dislike become politically incorrect to articulate. 
In a way, Section 703(j) also helps inform a contemporaneous 
definition of “discrimination” by telling us what could not be required 
and accordingly what would be allowed. Correcting for the effects of 
slavery and segregation could not be required under Title VII.202 That 
being the case, there was also no requirement to correct the belief 
systems consistent with slavery and segregation that caused the 
imbalance. Arguably, Section 703(j) approves of that belief system in 
preserving its effects and not requiring adjustment. Therefore, 
arguably, Title VII intentionally allows wide latitude for beliefs 
consistent with slavery and segregation to be influential in such a way 
that actions against individuals consistent with “discrimination” are not 
legally discriminatory because the motivations for the actions are 
consistent with Congress’s view of the very limited kind of 
discrimination Title VII was designed to end.203 
 
e. Placing the Enforcement Burden on the Individual 
When the Senate placed the entirety of the enforcement burden on 
                                                                                                       
 201. The legislative history repeatedly refers to the significant disparity in 
unemployment figures and the fact that the figures appeared to remain constant over 
time. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963). 
 202. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(j), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 203. Keeping in mind that I am discussing what appears to have been the intent of a 
Congress, whose members were all products of a segregated society, if United States 
Presidents can call black people “niggers” without suffering public ignominy, see 
KENNEDY, supra note 82 employers and labor organizations might also verbalize their 
beliefs without running afoul of Title VII. Even if expressed, bias or animus could be 
and were disconnected from the kind of intentional action Congress censured in Title 
VII. 
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the individual claimants in disparate treatment cases,204 Title VII made 
its final shift from a public to a private right.205 This shift stands out as 
a commentary on how very difficult Congress intended it to be for a 
claimant to prove intentional disparate treatment. In the first instance, 
placing the enforcement burden on the individual makes the Title VII 
rights less desirable because they are more burdensome.206 Congress 
did not make this decision in the abstract. The legislators put the 
enforcement burden on the party least able to successfully carry the 
burden, and they knew it.207 To make that option even less attractive, 
Congress made the less public and less financially rewarding avenue of 
conciliation the least costly and least burdensome. The discriminator 
would not be subject to public exposure208 and the discriminatee could 
get something for free now, or pay for the risk of getting nothing later. 
Congress took additional steps to assure that the burden of 
enforcement included more than investments of time and money. If 
Title VII were to have any value for disparate treatment claimants 
beyond the suppression of gross acts of discrimination, that value 
would only come from proving discrimination and receiving an 
affirmative award of employment, or reinstatement with back pay. 
Proving “discrimination” begs the question of the meaning of 
“discrimination” under Title VII.  Congress, however, failed to answer 
the question by failing to define “discrimination.”209 Given the 
acknowledged costs, Congress also made a successful disparate 
treatment claim almost impossible by establishing that a protected 
characteristic had to be the only reason for the discrimination in order 
for a court to grant affirmative relief.210 
                                                                                                       
 204. 110 CONG. REC. 12,722, 12723 (1964). 
 205. See Berg, supra note 62, at 85; Enforcement of Fair Employment, supra note 
60, at 432. 
 206. See Berg, supra note 62, at 96-97. That is also why the proponents of H.R. 405 
wanted the EEOC to mirror the NLRB. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963). 
 207. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,724 (1964). 
 208. Congress found it extremely important that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts be 
private to protect allegations of discrimination from harming alleged discriminators in 
the public eye. “This latter point is important, to prevent some irresponsible employee 
or other person from, in effect, conspiring to blackmail an employer with the 
publication of charges that may later prove to be false.” 110 CONG. REC. 14331 (June 
18, 1964). 
 209. See infra note 211. 
 210. Mr. Berg concluded that: “The enforcement procedures of the title, however, 
bear only too visibly the marks of compromise, and seem to me to contain serious 
deficiencies. It seems questionable that much can be accomplished through suits in 
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i. The Failure to Define “Discriminate” 
The reason or reasons why Congress did not define 
“discrimination” in Title VII remains obscure.211 It may be that 
Congress was sensitive to “the evolutionary change that constitutional 
law in the area racial discrimination was undergoing in 1964.”212 It may 
also be that “discrimination” was left undefined in the Civil Rights Act 
so that it might evolve.213 Within the context of the Congressional 
action on Title VII, it may also be that “discrimination” was 
understood well enough to be left undefined214 and that purposeful act 
had the intended consequence of leaving a claimant hamstrung as they 
attempted to prove discrimination in the form of disparate treatment. 
                                                                                                       
federal court by persons aggrieved by acts of discrimination. The practical advantages 
will lie heavily with the defendants, and even where the evidence of discrimination is 
overwhelming, it cannot be expected that many complainants will undertake the burden 
of an individual suit.” Berg, supra note 62, at 96-97. See also Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., 
Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. L. REV. 459, 462-63 (1965) (“And 
compliance with the letter [of Title VII] – both in terms of coverage and substance – 
may very well impose inconveniences and require more imagination to enable the 
continuation of practices, which exclude Negros from employment, but the legislation, 
as presently conceived, can do little to effectively prohibit these practices.”). 
 211. See generally Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976) (“While there 
is no necessary inference that Congress, in choosing this language, intended to 
incorporate into Title VII the concepts of discrimination, which have evolved from 
court decisions construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the similarities between the congressional language and some of those decisions surely 
indicate that the latter are a useful starting point in interpreting the former. Particularly 
in the case of defining the term “discrimination,” which Congress has nowhere in Title 
VII defined, those cases afford an existing body of law analyzing and discussing that 
term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns, which Congress 
manifested in enacting Title VII.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
337-38 (1978) (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he legislative history [of Title VI and, 
more generally, the Civil Rights Act of 1964] shows that Congress specifically 
eschewed any static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could 
be shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine. 
Although it is clear from the debates that the supporters of Title VI intended to ban 
uses of race prohibited by the Constitution and, more specifically, the maintenance of 
segregated facilities, they never precisely defined the term “discrimination,” or what 
constituted an exclusion from participation or a denial of benefits on the ground of 
race.”). 
 212. Bakke, at 339-40. 
 213. Id. at 337-39. 
 214. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
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What can be known is that the absence of a definition of 
“discrimination” in H. R. 7152 was a topic of discussion in the 
legislature specifically regarding Title VI.215 The discussions specific 
to H.R. 405, which became Title VII, are more substantive and 
satisfying for having provided definitions of “discrimination.” In 
hearings on H. R. 405 before the General Subcommittee on Labor of 
the Committee on Education and Labor, Congressmen heard a number 
of definitions for “discrimination”: 
[E]mployment discrimination against Negroes is defined 
as any behavior on the part of an employer toward a Negro 
employee or potential employee, which reflects a negative 
evaluation of that person’s race to the extent that the 
employer either refuses to utilize that person or 
underutilizes him, and/or underpays him.216 
 
A simple definition is sufficient. Let us refer to 
                                                                                                       
 215. See 110 CONG. REC. 1,619 (1964) (“It [Title VI] is aimed toward eliminating 
discrimination in federally assisted programs. It contains no guideposts and no 
yardsticks as to what might constitute discrimination in carrying out federally aided 
programs and projects.”) (statement of Rep. Abernethy); 110 CONG. REC. 1,632 (1964) 
(“Nowhere in the bill [H.R. 7152] is the word ‘discrimination’ defined, so each 
department and each agency [of the executive branch] could prescribe its own 
definition, and the President could prescribe a definition for his actions.”) (statement of 
Rep. Dowdy); 110 CONG. REC. 5,251 (1964) (“Title VI makes the cutoff [of Federal 
aid programs] mandatory. All that is required is ‘an express finding’ of a failure to 
comply with an undefined prohibition against discrimination in the administration of 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, and the President’s 
approval.”) (statement of Sen. Talmadge); 110 CONG. REC. 5,611-12 (1964) (“I have 
mentioned the fact that the word ‘discrimination’ is used in section 601 of Title VI. 
The word ‘discrimination,’ without any context, means merely the act of treating one 
differently from another. * * * The word ‘discrimination,’ as used in this reference, has 
no contextual explanation whatever, other than the provision that the discrimination ‘is 
to be against’ individuals participating in or benefiting from federally assisted 
programs and activities on the ground specified. With this context, the discrimination 
condemned by this reference occurs only when an individual is treated unequally or 
unfairly because of his race, color, religion, or national origin. What constitutes 
unequal or unfair treatment?”) (statement of Sen. Ervin); 110 CONG. REC. 6,052 (1964) 
(“Such action [cutting federal funding] can also be taken when the agency finds that a 
person has been subjected to discrimination under such programs. It may be clear 
enough what the first two clauses mean, but if it means more than the first two, what 
does the clause ‘subjected to discrimination’ mean? To what does that phrase apply?”) 
(statement of Sen. Johnson). 
 216. Equal Employment Opportunity Hearings Before the General Subcomm. of 
Labor of the Comm. On Education and Labor, 88th Cong., at 198 (1963) (testimony of 
Walter B. Lewis, Director, Job Development, Washington Urban League). 
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employment discrimination as any nonobjective behavior 
on the part of an employer toward an employee or 
potential employee, which reflects some intuitive negative 
evaluation (prejudice) of the employee’s race to the extent 
that the employer, when confronted with a manpower 
need, will either not use the employee, underutilize him 
and/or undercompensate him.217 
 
Now, discrimination is practiced particularly when there is 
a scarcity of employment opportunities. You get an 
intensification of attitude by whites seeking to discriminate 
against the Negroes because there are too few jobs to go 
around. Of course, some will create artificial differences of 
race or religion to allege to try to allege a superior claim to 
employment.218 
It is argued, we know, that discrimination springs from 
prejudice, from bigotry, and that legislation cannot cure 
it. We will agree that legislation cannot cure prejudice. 
But legislation can prevent at least a part of the fruits of 
prejudice from coming into harvest. Legislation is the 
way, the only sure way we know, to limit the degree to 
which people can act on their prejudices. It can eliminate 
discrimination.219 
 
All of these definitions reflect an understanding that employment 
“discrimination” had two components: the denial of opportunity based 
on a readily knowable, objective characteristic, and a subjective 
motivation—prejudice—to take adverse action based on the objective 
characteristic. These components suggest that the goal of preventing 
discrimination is to limit the degree to which some intuitive negative 
evaluation is able to be used to justify adverse employment action. So 
by definition, intent to discriminate becomes irrelevant, if employment 
“discrimination” is “any behavior on the part of an employer toward 
[an] employee or potential employee, which reflects a negative 
evaluation of that person’s race [color, religion, national origin or 
                                                                                                       
 217. Id. at 203-04 (testimony of Walter B. Lewis). 
 218. Id. at 70 (testimony of James Carey, President, International Union of 
Electrical, Radio Machine Workers, AFL-CIO; Secretary-Treasurer, Industrial Union 
Department, AFL-CIO). 
 219. Id. at 20 (testimony of James Carey). 
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gender] to the extent that the employer either refuses to utilize that 
person or underutilizes him/her, and/or underpays him/her.”220 
Although it is encouraging that the hearings on H. R. 405 
revealed these definitions, they are not so materially different from the 
possible definition of discrimination reconstructed from Title VII’s 
temporal context, and Congress did not adopt this or any definition of 
“discrimination” in Title VII. One may therefore argue that Congress 
understood that discrimination occurred because of prejudice against 
an objective characteristic and that prejudice could be defined as any 
behavior reflecting a non-objective negative evaluation. Refusing to 
put this understanding in writing means that, regardless of what 
Congress intended, it was not going to penalize just “any behavior . . . 
which reflects a negative evaluation.”221 
An “any behavior” definition of discrimination could also include 
behaviors that were not socially objectionable at the time.222  To keep 
“discrimination” from taking on such breadth, the behavior would have 
to reflect prejudice and be an intentional act based on that prejudice to 
the exclusion of other possible causes for an adverse personnel 
decision. In that way, employment discrimination would at least have 
to describe an extremely close relationship, if not an identity, between 
belief and result. The additional burden on the individual disparate 
treatment plaintiff was that in failing to provide a definition, Congress 
gave no direction on how to successfully prove “discrimination” 
outside of the most obvious cases where a statement of belief—nigger, 
etc.—occurred contemporaneously with an adverse employment 
decision. 
ii. Enforcement of Title VII Rights 
One could conclude, based on the current knowledge that proving 
disparate treatment is extremely difficult,223 that Congress intended to 
                                                                                                       
 220. Id. at 203-04 (testimony of Walter B. Lewis). 
 221. Id. at 198 (testimony of Walter B. Lewis). 
 222. See supra note 203. 
 223. See Hard to Win, supra note 13. In addition to Professor Selmi’s observations 
about why race discrimination cases seem hard to win, significant empirical work 
supports the conclusion that they are hard to win Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs In Federal Court: From Bad To 
Worse?, 3 HARV. LAW & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009). Professor Wendy Parker describes 
the fact that race discrimination cases have the least chance of success. See Wendy 
Parker, Lessons In Losing: Race Discrimination In Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 889 (2006). Professor Parker concluded that plaintiffs are treated worse than 
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make this burden extremely difficult to prove. Without speculating, it 
is clear that the method of proving discrimination concerned the House 
and Senate. One of the exchanges on this issue provides a fair example 
of the nature of that concern: 
Objection: If the employer discharges a Negro, he must 
prove that the dismissal had nothing to do with race. When 
an employer promotes or increases the pay of a white 
employee, he must show that he was not biased against the 
Negro worker who was not promoted. 
Answer: The Commission must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the discharge or other personnel action 
was because of race.224 
The answer to this objection encapsulated the pivot position. 
First, it needed to be clear that an employer did not need to prove 
anything.225 Second, it needed to be clear that liability under Title VII 
required intent: “because of race.”226 
The relentless concern in the Senate about proving discrimination 
is somewhat curious given the changes to the enforcement provision of 
H.R. 405 before and after it became Title VII. Initially, H. R. 405 did 
not address causation.227 It allowed the Commission, after finding an 
unlawful employment practice by preponderance of the evidence, to 
issue cease and desist orders, negative relief, and to “take such 
affirmative action, including reinstatement or hiring of employees, with 
or without back pay . . . as will effectuate the policies of the Act . . .”228 
If the Commission found no unlawful employment practice, it was to 
issue an appropriate order dismissing the complaint.”229 This was the 
most liberal iteration of the causation issue; it made no statement about 
                                                                                                       
defendants “for reasons that don’t appear to be race neutral.” Id. at 893 n. 15. Professor 
Parker argues that there is judicial agreement ab initio with the employer defendants’ 
position that plaintiffs’ cases are meritless. Courts “proceed from a perception that 
discredits the likelihood of plaintiffs’ claims and validates the defendants’ story.” Id. at 
934. 
 224. 110 CONG. REC. 7,218 (1964). 
 225. The fear of an employer having the burden of proving the absence of 
discrimination had been expressed in the committee report on H.R. 405. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 88-570 (1963). 
 226. Id. 
 227. By “causation” I mean the necessary proof of harm to entitle a claimant to 
affirmative, as opposed to negative, relief. 
 228. H.R. REP. NO. 88-570, § 9(j) (1963). 
 229. Id. 
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intent and was likely to be enforced in the manner the NLRB enforced 
the NLRA’s provisions on unfair labor practices in the discharge 
context. As the NLRB was notorious at the time for readily finding 
unfair labor practices,230 the EEOC was on a path toward establishing a 
standard where a charging party could prevail by demonstrating that 
race, color, religion or national origin (sex had not yet been added) was 
merely a factor in an adverse decision. 
The next iteration of H. R. 405 replaced Kennedy’s Title VII. H. 
R. 405’s enforcement provision had changed to restrict the ease with 
which causation could be found. The initial Title VII allowed the 
Board231 after finding an unlawful employment practice by 
preponderance of the evidence, to issue cease and desist orders and to 
“take such affirmative action, including reinstatement or hiring of 
employees, with or without back pay . . . as will effectuate the policies 
of the title . . .”232 Now, however, instead of leaving the Board to its 
own devices, Title VII commanded: 
No order of the Board shall require the admission or 
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union or 
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as 
an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if 
such individual was refused admission, suspended, or 
expelled or was refused employment or advancement or 
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than 
race, religion, color, national origin, or ancestry.233 
One logical way of reading this change is that the Board can only 
award meaningful relief if race, religion, color, national origin or 
ancestry was the only reason for the unlawful employment practice.234 
“Any reason other than”235 those protected categories would be a 
                                                                                                       
 230. Id. 
 231. By this time, H. R. 405/Title VII reflected the split in the EEOC’s duties 
between the Administrator as investigator and prosecutor and the Board as adjudicator. 
 232. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963). 
 233. Id. at 85-86 (emphasis added). 
 234. Professor Brodin presciently suggested that the distinction between negative 
and affirmative relief would still allow the Board to grant negative relief if there was 
disparate treatment for any reason in addition to the proscribed reasons. See Brodin, 
supra note 138, at 298. See also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 523-24 
(1993) (“Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a 
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers 
who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context 
of the present case) race.”) (emphasis added). 
 235. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 85-86 (1963) (emphasis added). 
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complete bar to the only meaningful relief a disparate treatment 
claimant would want: a job, a promotion, retroactive seniority and/or 
back-pay. Although neither the text nor this reading address which 
party would have to prove or disprove “any reason other than,”236 
available evidence strongly suggests that “the [claimant] must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge or other personnel 
action was because of race.”237 This is a very satisfying standard of 
causation if the desire is to limit the ability of a claimant to 
successfully prove discrimination in all but the worst cases. It partially 
serves the meritocracy theme when any other reason relates to 
objective qualifications, skills or ability. It also serves the dominant 
theme peculiar to Title VII, the preservation of the maximum extent of 
management prerogatives and union freedoms which went well beyond 
objective job performance criteria. 
The next version of the enforcement provision changed 
“discharged for any reason other than race, religion, color, national 
origin, or ancestry”238 to “discharged for cause.”239 This language 
represents a dramatic reversal of direction. “For cause” was a term of 
art under federal labor law. It came into play when an employee 
claimed an adverse employment decision, for example, occurred 
because he or she had exercised his or her protected rights under the 
NLRA. An employer responded to the employee’s allegation by 
asserting that the adverse employment action was “for cause.” The 
employer, however, had to show that the “cause” was the reason for the 
adverse employment action untainted by an employee’s exercise of his 
or her rights under the NLRA.240 “Cause” excluded most subjective 
                                                                                                       
 236. Id. 
 237. 110 CONG. REC. 7,218 (1964). See also H.R. REP. NO. 88-570 (1963). 
Congressmen expressed their fear of employers having the de facto burden of proving 
that they did not discriminate. 
 238. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 86 (1963). 
 239. See Comment, Strike Misconduct: An Illusory Bar To Reinstatement, 72 YALE 
L. J. 182, 194-197 (1962). 
 240. Bon-R Reproductions, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 309 F.2d 898, 906 (2nd Cir. 1962) (“It 
is, of course, true, that §8(a)(3) is violated even if there is a legitimate motive for 
discharging an employee if one of the motives is antagonism to unions.”), citing 
N.L.R.B. v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725, 726 (2nd Cir. 1954); Sunshine 
Biscuits, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 274 F.2d 738, 742-43 (7th Cir. 1960); N.L.R.B. v. Lewis, 
246 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1957) (“There is no shortage of cases holding if one 
discharges an employee, assigning or holding inwardly the wrong reason, it benefits 
not the employer to have had a justifiable reason which he did not assert or which did 
not motivate him.”). 
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factors because subjectivity could easily be seen as an improper anti-
union motive in the labor context.241 Therefore, had it been retained in 
Title VII, a “for cause” standard reflected a definition of discrimination 
that limited the degree to which subjective considerations could justify 
adverse employment action. Moreover, if courts had held “for cause” 
had the same meaning under Title VII as it had in federal labor law, an 
employer would have had the burden to prove that the adverse decision 
was untainted by considerations of race. The issues raised by the “for 
cause” standard, however, never made it to the courts. 
The final amendment to Title VII’s enforcement provision in the 
House replaced “cause” with a formula almost identical to the language 
that “cause” had replaced.242 The amendment was made “to specify 
cause.”243 Representative Celler, the House sponsor of H.R. 7152, 
explained that his amendment was to assure that a court “cannot find 
any violation of the act which is based on facts other—and I emphasize 
‘other’—than discrimination on the grounds of race . . . .”244  When 
Title VII went to the Senate, it read: 
No order of the court shall require the admission or 
reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union or 
the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as 
an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if 
such individual was refused admission, suspended, or 
expelled or was refused employment or advancement or 
was suspended or discharged for any reason other than 
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.245 
Celler’s amendment returned causation to a standard that allowed 
“any other reason” to trump a claim for affirmative relief for disparate 
treatment. 
The harum-scarum method Congress used to create the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provides an explanation for continued calls for 
                                                                                                       
 241. See Int’l Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink & Distillery 
Workers of America v. N.L.R.B., 298 F.2d 297, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1961)(majority 
concluded that employer’s “for cause” justification was “insincerely raised and was 
utilized as a pure pretext to mask [employer’s] discriminatory purpose.”)  In this way 
“cause” is similar to the definition of “discrimination” witnesses offered to the 
committee responsible for H.R. 405. 
 242. 110 CONG. REC. 2,567 (1964). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. (emphasis added). 
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clarifying that Title VII only covered intentional discrimination based 
only on a proscribed characteristic.246 Apparently, no one in the Senate 
considered that Congressman Celler’s amendment effectively defined 
discrimination as proof of an adverse personnel action based solely on 
a proscribed characteristic by only permitting affirmative relief in the 
complete absence of any reason other than a proscribed characteristic. 
Likewise, no one recognized that the same amendment acknowledged 
the existence of mixed motivations for an adverse personnel action by 
allowing other contemporaneous reasons to defeat a claim for 
affirmative relief. The failure to recognize the Cellar amendment’s 
force can be attributed to the haphazard manner in which Title VII was 
cobbled together or, a failure to debate the impact of replacing “for 
cause” with Cellar’s language, or, perhaps, a conscious desire to avoid 
an explicit statement that there could be no affirmative relief for a 
successful claim of disparate treatment if race was not the sole factor 
for the adverse employment decision. Whatever the reason, the failure 
to recognize the implication of the Cellar amendment seems related to 
an effort to add “solely” to the operative language of Section 703 so 
that Title VII only prohibited discrimination “solely because of . . .” a 
proscribed characteristic. 
The effort to add “solely” failed.247 Senator McClellan of 
Arkansas proposed adding the language “solely” so that section 703 
would not “be a dragnet, a catchall, to leave something uncertain for a 
court to interpret.”248 In support, Senator Long of Louisiana explained: 
“I cannot for the life of me understand why someone would want to 
insist on leaving out the word ‘solely,’ because my impression was that 
if it were desired to hire someone because he was a brother-in-law or a 
first cousin, a person could not complain that he failed to get the job 
because of his race.”249 Senator Lausche from Ohio agreed that the 
addition of “solely” was a mere clarification that “because of” really 
meant “only because of.”250 Senators Case and Magnuson responded 
that “solely” would negate Title VII.251 Senator Case also observed 
that: “If anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single 
                                                                                                       
 246. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,702-11 (1964) (Senators discuss the number of 
amendments and the problem of duplication in an attempt to describe the current status 
of the Civil Rights Act). 
 247. 110 CONG. REC. at 13,837-38 (1964). 
 248. Id. at 13,837. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know of.”252 
There were causation concerns, but the attempted addition of 
“solely” in Section 703 is better described as part of the confusion 
about the number and duplication of amendments, and the geographic 
distance between the descriptions of unlawful employment practices in 
Section 703 and the descriptions of the liability for those practices in 
Section 706, coupled with Senator McClellan’s desire express what 
everyone apparently understood: Title VII granted affirmative relief 
where an adverse employment decision happened only because of one 
or more proscribed criteria. The issue of mixed motives Senator Case 
raised was already imbedded in Section 706(g). Therefore, Senator 
Case partially erred in concluding that “solely” would negate Title 
VII.253 “Solely” would have required a claimant to prove that race was 
the only reason for an adverse employment decision to receive any 
relief. The Celler amendment had already negated Title VII’s force by 
compelling disparate treatment claimants to prove sole causation as the 
predicate to the affirmative relief that gave Title VII rights any value. 
One could prove discrimination but receive no affirmative relief where 
other reasons, subjective or objective, existed. 
Although the Senate resisted the urge to clarify Section 703 by 
adding “solely,” they succumbed to the desire to clarify or amplify the 
                                                                                                       
 252. Id. Interestingly, no Senator disabused Senator Long of his understanding of 
Title VII. 
 253. On this point, I must respectfully disagree with Professor Brodin’s assessment 
of the rejection of McClellan’s amendment as evidence of the rejection of a “sole 
factor” test under Title VII. See Brodin, supra note 138, at 287. Congressman Celler’s 
amendment had already been made to Title VII and replaced “for cause” with “any 
reason” and in doing so confirmed that affirmative relief would be denied where a 
claimant failed to prove that there were no reasons other than proscribed reasons for an 
adverse employment decision. To that end, there was no mixed-motives mystery in the 
88th Congress. Moreover, an attempt to describe the operation of Sections 703 and 
706(g) as one where a claimant can prove liability under Section 703, but receive no 
affirmative relief only makes sense if Section 703 is viewed as something more than a 
description of unlawful employment practices and Section 706(g) as something less 
than a complete description of the standard of causation. Courts have come to 
alternative conclusions, like Professor Brodin’s, but they have done so without giving 
due consideration to the evolution of Title VII from H. R. 403, the evolution of what 
became Section 706(g), and most specifically Congressman Celler’s tying relief to the 
absence of any other reason including wanting to hire a brother-in-law or first cousin. I 
agree with Professor Brodin that since Celler’s amendment only addressed conditions 
on which a court could grant affirmative relief, it is possible that a court could grant 
some other kind of relief. See id. at 298. Balanced against a job, a promotion, back-
dated seniority, or back-pay, what would be the value of any other kind of relief to a 
disparate treatment plaintiff complaining about a refusal to hire or promote? 
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necessity for intent by adding “intentionally” to the enforcement 
provisions of Section 706(g).254  Before the amendment, the first 
sentence of Section 706(g) allowed a court to award relief if it found 
that “the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful 
employment practice.”255 As amended and in its current form, Section 
706(g) authorizes relief where a claimant proves that “the respondent 
has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful 
employment practice.”256 
At the time of the amendment, “intentionally,” was seen as 
essentially superfluous “[s]ince the title bars only discrimination 
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin it would seem to 
already require intent.”257 It was not “a substantive change in the 
title.”258 The addition simply clarified that there was no liability for 
“inadvertent or accidental discriminations.”259 In the temporal context, 
this description provides a snapshot of how Congress thought about 
discrimination; it obviously had to be something that was done on 
purpose. There was no reason in the segregated America of the early-
60’s to pretend otherwise. 
On the other hand, actually adding “intentionally” to the statute 
invited courts to give the language some meaning as the descriptor of 
how a respondent was engaging in an unlawful employment practice.260 
                                                                                                       
 254. See 110 CONG. REC. 14,331 (1964) (“The Senate amendments require that no 
employer can be held responsible for any violation, unless it can be proved that such a 
violation was intentional.”); 110 CONG. REC. 14,331-32 (1964) (“A further safeguard 
that was provided by the Senate amendment deals with proceedings against employers 
in Federal court. It provides that the unlawful employment practice complained of must 
be an intentional one: The employer must have intended to discriminate before a court 
could grant any relief.”). 
 255. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 12 (1963). 
 256. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(g), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 257. 110 CONG. REC. 12,723 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey, one of H. R. 
7152’s key proponents). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 12,724. 
 260. See Berg, supra note 62, at 71. Mr. Berg predicted this outcome, but struggled 
to comprehend its complete significance for two reasons. First, he appears to be 
completely focused on what were literally issues of “black and white” at the time. So, 
“unintentional discrimination” did not register in relation to proscribed criterion, that 
were not self-declaratory. Second, because discrimination was something done on 
purpose in his time, “unintentional discrimination” seemed far-fetched; an expression 
of the subconscious impossible to prove. Accordingly, if it existed, such “unintentional 
discrimination” was not a significant loss if exempted from coverage by Section 
706(g). Id. at n. 14. 
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If “intentionally” means that “the asserted act of discrimination must 
have been knowingly and deliberately”261 based on a proscribed 
characteristic, then its addition was more likely meant to address 
discrimination claims where the proscribed characteristic was not open 
and notorious, like religion or natural origin.262 In such cases, absence 
of knowledge makes sense as a defense to liability. This reading also 
makes sense of the legislative history. “Intentionally” did not 
materially alter the understanding of Title VII, it merely clarified that it 
was possible for an employer (claim) to lack sufficient knowledge of 
the proscribed characteristic to discriminate and to place the burden of 
establishing that knowledge on the claimant.263 
Under this reading, in the ordinary course, intent would not be a 
difficult proposition if it were restrained to assuring that the decision-
maker knew that the identity of the target of discrimination fell within 
a proscribed category. Intent then describes a reason for an action. A 
claimant would then be responsible for proving that his or her identity 
was the only reason for the action in question: an adverse employment 
decision. Given the language in Section 706(g)’s final sentence, the 
burden of proof also required the exclusion of any reason other than the 
claimant’s protected status.264 
That this conclusion has been maddeningly perplexing is a 
                                                                                                       
 261. Id. 
 262. Not to exclude the possibility that race and color might be mistaken by, or 
hidden from, a decision maker. America had been an involuntary genetic melting pot 
for about 400 years. As a result, people, who would be legally defined as black under 
the “one drop rule,” could be mistaken as white or could take advantage of being that 
light-skinned, light-eyed, and fine-haired to escape the cruelty of segregation. See 
LANGSTON HUGHES, THE WAYS OF WHITE FOLKS (1934). 
 263. This explanation also stands up to the fact that there was a proposal that 
“willfully” be used to describe the manner of the unlawful employment practice so that 
“[g]ood faith should be made a defense for all persons accused of discrimination.” 110 
CONG. REC. 12,641 (1964). The proposal came from the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States, which was pressing for the complete elimination of Title VII from H. R. 
7152. Id. Given the Chamber’s avowed animosity toward Title VII, it seems more 
likely that adding “willfully” was an effort to make the burden of proof something 
greater than simple intent for the kind of discrimination Congress tried to address. This 
kind of discrimination included nothing more than the disparate treatment of 
individuals and excluded the deliberate exclusion of blacks as a group in the sense of 
requiring or promoting the correction of racial imbalances in hiring. The claim that 
such discrimination could happen in “good faith,” in some general way so that all 
persons accused of discrimination could claim “good faith” as a defense, is difficult to 
square with the Chamber’s agenda at the time. 
 264. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706(g), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
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combination of the expectations of the Civil Rights Era,265 the Court’s 
excursions into lawmaking based on a manipulation of those 
expectations as its statement of the “purpose” or “intent” of Title VII 
changed,266 and an overreaction to the word “intentionally” in terms of 
what it required in terms of the level of proof and what it could capture 
as a descriptor of “discrimination.”267 
 
III. WHY TITLE VII WORKS – UNDERSTANDING MCDONNELL 
DOUGLAS 
Disparate treatment cases like Ash demonstrate that Title VII is 
serving the purposes of the Congress that created it: to assure that Title 
VII minimally impacted existing management prerogatives and union 
freedoms.268 This was immediately apparent to the early Title VII 
scholars.269 They concluded that disparate treatment plaintiffs had little 
chance of vindicating their rights under Title VII.270 In that sense, 
results like Ash were predicted.271 Proponents of the view that Title VII 
should eradicate all employment discrimination appealed to the courts 
for enforcement the spirit rather than the letter of the law; further 
evidencing the obvious and almost insurmountable difficulties in Title 
VII’s text if its purpose went beyond eliminating only the most overt 
kinds of discrimination.272 These difficulties were called problems or 
failures and are still seen in those terms because of the strength of the 
cognition that Title VII is meant to eradicate employment 
discrimination. Giving the actual intent and purpose of Title VII its due 
                                                                                                       
 265. See supra Part I. 
 266. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 378-83 (observing that the Court’s 
efforts to come to majoritarian, therefore “legitimate,” legal conclusions causes a 
certain “anxiety over its creative law making role” and a form of obfuscation that 
drives the Court to search for “objective” reasons to support a wholly “subjective” 
outcome and an irrational reverence for such “objective” indicia.). 
 267. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27. 
 268. See supra Part II.B. 
 269. See Berg, supra note 62, at 96-97; Affeldt, Part I, supra note 58, at 669; 
Cooksey, supra note 84, at 419-420, 430; Schmidt, supra note 209, at 462-3 (“And 
compliance with the letter [of Title VII] – both in terms of coverage and substance – 
may very well impose inconveniences and require more imagination to enable the 
continuation of practices which exclude Negros from employment, but the legislation, 
as presently conceived, can do little to effectively prohibit these practices.”). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Robert J. Affeldt, Title VII In The Federal Courts – Private Or Public Law 
PART II, 15 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1971); Hill, supra note 87. 
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weight dispels the cognitive dissonance. 
The fact that Congress created Title VII, as to disparate treatment, 
with a view to preserving the maxim extent possible of management 
prerogatives circa 1964 invites an analysis of the Court’s 
implementation of Congress’ mandate. Given the Court’s decisions in 
Griggs, for example, where the Court demonstrated an allegiance to 
purposes that Congress rejected,273 what explains the Court’s cleaving 
so closely to the limits of Title VII in McDonnell Douglas and its 
progeny? The answer does not reside in the McDonnell Douglas 
decision itself. The opinion references the broad social policy that 
animated Griggs and specifically declares that “Title VII tolerates no 
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”274 The Court then proceeds 
to manufacture the infamous burden shifting analysis that married Title 
VII to the identity Congress gave it in 1963 and 1964. The Court’s 
sphinx-like decision explains little. One of the ways to understand it is 
as a response to a dialogue commenced by the Eighth Circuit. 
In the Eighth Circuit and below, McDonnell Douglas never 
disputed Green’s qualifications to do the job.275 Instead, McDonnell 
Douglas relied on Green’s involvement in illegal protest activity 
against the company to deny him employment.276 In the Eighth Circuit 
the divided panel relied heavily on Griggs to reject McDonnell 
Douglas’s argument. The Eighth Circuit responded that hiring 
decisions based on subjective criteria carried little weight.277 The 
Eighth Circuit based this conclusion squarely on the Griggs holding: 
“If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot 
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is 
prohibited.”278 Following this reasoning, in words that completely 
mirror Griggs, the 8th Circuit explained: 
In enacting Title VII, Congress has mandated the removal 
of racial barriers to employment. Judicial acceptance of 
subjectively based hiring decisions must be limited if Title 
VII is to be more that an illusory commitment to that end, 
for subjective criteria may mask aspects of prohibited 
prejudice. Employers seldom admit racial discrimination. 
                                                                                                       
 273. See discussion supra Part II.B.3c. 
 274. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 801 (1973). 
 275. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 276. Id. at. 343. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
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Its presence is often cloaked in generalities or vague 
criteria which do not measure an applicant’s qualifications 
in terms of job requirements.279 
* * * 
Blind acceptance of any non-discriminatory reason offered 
by an employer in a fair employment case would always 
preclude correction of any discriminatory practices 
otherwise existing. It has generally been said that an 
employer may refuse to hire or decide to fire any employee 
for any reason he chooses. Civil rights legislation and case 
law dealing with discriminatory employment practices 
have added modification to these principles. 
Discriminatory motives even though they constitute only a 
partial basis for an employer’s refusal to hire are not 
sanctioned.280 
* * * 
The hard nut of it all is that the public interest to be carried 
out in the legislative requirement of fair and equal 
employment practices possesses a higher value that the 
likes or dislikes of a particular employer.281 
If the Supreme Court adopted the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, it 
would effectively define the language “discrimination” in Section 703 
as a personnel decision: 1) based on non-job-related criteria; 2) 
regardless of the facially non-discriminatory nature of the criteria; 3) so 
long as the claimant was qualified to do the job. It would create an 
environment where employers had to demonstrate an objective job-
related cause for any adverse personnel decision. Given the close 
philosophical ties to Griggs, adopting the Eighth Circuit’s conclusions 
also opened doors to a version of Title VII in disparate treatment cases 
that fully acknowledged the continuing negative impacts of historical 
harm and made correcting for those impacts Title VII’s core purpose. 
The Court, as we know, did not adopt this reasoning. In rejecting the 
                                                                                                       
 279. Id. at 343 (citations omitted). Since Green had the objective job qualifications, 
McDonnell Douglas was unlikely to be able to avoid hiring him. “[i]f McDonnell’s 
refusal to hire Green rests upon management’s personal dislike for Green or personal 
distaste for his conduct in the civil rights field, Green is entitle to some relief.” Id. at 
344. Twenty years later, in St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502 (1993), the 
Court approved personal animosity as a legal justification for an adverse employment 
decision. 
 280. Id. at 345-6. 
 281. Id. at 346. 
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Eighth Circuit’s attempt to apply and extend the Griggs interpretation 
of Title VII, the Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas opinion gives 
priority to the preservation of existing employer prerogatives to rely on 
subjective criteria by limiting Griggs to its context. In doing so, the 
Court adopted the company’s argument that Title VII protects 
subjective decision-making.282 
Without specifically addressing the individual elements of the 8th 
Circuit’s description of how Title VII should work, the Court discretely 
rejected them all. The Eighth Circuit found that subjective criteria 
limited an employer’s ability to justify a decision.283 The Court 
responded that “the [Eighth Circuit] seriously underestimated the 
rebuttal weight to which [McDonnell Douglas’] reasons were 
entitled.”284 It pronounced that an employment decision based on 
unlawful conduct standing alone fell outside of Congress’ intentions to 
remove arbitrary and unreasonable barriers to employment.285 The 
Court’s statement about the weight to give employer justifications 
coupled with its tacit approval of the use of decisional criteria not 
related to ability to perform a particular job made employers’ evidence 
of non-discriminatory reasons practically unassailable.286 Finally, by 
resurrecting the legitimacy of McDonnell Douglas’ reason for refusing 
Green, the Court also rejected the Eighth Circuit’s proposition that any 
legal motivation for a personnel action would be irreparably tainted by 
a coexisting discriminatory motive.287 
The McDonnell Douglas decision, like Griggs, picks up on the 
meritocracy theme. Unlike Griggs, however, McDonnell Douglas 
                                                                                                       
 282. The McDonnell Douglas Court specifically distinguished Griggs because 
Griggs dealt with the disparate impacts of standardized testing and the impermissibility 
of “freezing” blacks out of employment opportunities because of the continuing 
impacts of segregation. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805-06. Moreover, the 
victims in Griggs had done nothing to deserve being excluded from employment 
opportunities. Id. Green presented a different picture because Green engaged in illegal 
protest activity. Id. at 806. McDonnell Douglas rejected him for that reason. Id. 
 283. Green, 463 F.3d at 343. 
 284. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803. 
 285. Id. at 806. 
 286. Id. at 803. 
 287. Green, 463 F.3d at 346 (Judge Lay’s concurrence:  
The evidence must show that the employee’s lawful activities . . . were in 
no part a motivating factor in the employer’s decision and the reason for 
the rejections is objectively related to job performance. Without this 
showing any reason could otherwise be used to mask the denial of 
protected rights.). 
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conforms completely to the Civil Rights Era meritocracy as entirely 
prospective in disparate treatment cases. In McDonnell Douglas, the 
Court’s view of meritocracy is best seen from the vantage point of its 
rejection of the 8th Circuit’s position on the issue. The Eighth Circuit 
saw personnel decisions as merit determinations where the only 
relevant merit was a candidate’s ability to perform the specific 
functions of a given job. Subjective criteria, as the likely reservoir of 
discriminatory thought and action, could not be suborned by Title VII. 
The Court maintained the following view: 
There are societal as well as personal interests on both 
sides of this equation. The broad, overriding interest, 
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient 
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and 
racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.288 
The Court’s description of an overarching interest in “efficient 
and trustworthy workmanship” stands in place of the words “individual 
merit and achievement” and “colorblindness.” In the Court’s eyes, 
meritocracy is the shared, therefore, dispositive principle.289 The Court, 
however, did not explain the relationship between this conclusion and 
Title VII and is criticized for creating “just one example of the many 
statutory constructions enacted by the courts without due consideration 
for statutory heritage.”290 That conclusion is based on the cognition that 
Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, “subtle or otherwise.”291 
The conflicts within McDonnell Douglas call that belief into question. 
An exploration of why the McDonnell Douglas Court did not explain 
its reasoning helps to resolve the conflict. 
Professors Eskridge and Frickey have observed that the Court’s 
failure to candidly explain its answers to ambiguous questions is a 
result of anxiety about how to give a legitimate explanation of its 
                                                                                                       
 288. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.  at 801. 
 289. The import of this statement, however, is not limited to the Court’s views on 
meritocracy. It is also a description of the tension between visions of Title VII as a 
public (societal) law and as a private (personal) law. That said, the Court’s decision in 
McDonnell Douglas to retain the scope and power of employer prerogatives had ample 
support in the legislative history, despite the Court’s failure to rely on that history. See 
Part II, supra for a discussion of the relevant legislative history and Part III, supra for a 
discussion of how that legislative history supports the Court’s McDonnell Douglas 
decision. 
 290. Sperino, supra note 19, at 805. 
 291. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. 
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reasoning process.292 The anxiety drives the Court into the arms of 
foundationalism where it usually finds something in the text, the 
purpose or intent to link the decision to the statute. The statue is 
legitimate because the elected representatives of the people created and 
executed it. Any link to the source of legitimacy will do. In McDonnell 
Douglas, however, this kind of anxiety does not account for the 
complete absence of an explanation for the outcome. An explanation 
was handy in the text and in the purpose or intent as described in the 
legislative history. The Court could have explained that: 
Under Section 706(g) as supported by the intent of the 
Congressmen and Senators most responsible for crafting 
and enacting Title VII, Mr. Green will have to prove that 
his race was the only reason he was not hired. It was 
obviously the legislature’s intent to preserve, to the 
maximum extent possible exiting management 
prerogatives. These prerogatives include reasons such as 
the desire to hire a brother-in-law or first cousin. They 
include personal animosity. They also include the 
claimant’s acts of disloyalty and illegal protests of an 
employer’s hiring practices. 
The Court did not do this. 
The availability of the usual elements of foundationalism and the 
Court’s avoidance of them, leads to the conclusion that the Court’s lack 
of candor in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny had a source other 
than anxiety. A likely source of the Court’s reticence was its awareness 
of Title VII’s significant limitations for disparate treatment plaintiffs 
and it’s unwillingness to describe that knowledge because of the 
impact the description would have had on themselves and the Country. 
In light of the knowledge that we can safely insist the Court had or 
should have had, not explaining the unanimous ruling of McDonnell 
Douglas preserved the Court and the Country from the exposure of the 
dissonance between what the Court achieved in Griggs293 and 
Congress’ elevation of the protection of existing management 
prerogatives above racial discrimination in employment.294 
                                                                                                       
 292. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 379. 
 293. Id. at 380 (“And whatever the problems of relativism in science or philosophy, 
they are even more troubling in legal theory, where, because of the clear link between 
law and political power, arbitrariness is most to be feared.”). 
 294. SITKOFF, supra note 73, at 210 (“The movement had secured basic civil rights 
for African-Americans. . .”); WOODWARD, supra note 57, at v (“Thus within one 
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Another answer to the question why the Court failed to explain 
itself in McDonnell Douglas is simple: It did not have to.  The urge to 
explain is the child of the desire to establish legitimacy.295 In this case, 
I think of legitimacy in terms of having reached the correct result from 
both a foundational296 and an “evolutive” perspective.297 The more 
                                                                                                       
week a historic movement reached its peak of achievement and optimism and 
immediately confronted the beginning of a period of challenge and reaction called in 
question some of its greatest hopes and aspirations.”). 
In fact, by 1973, the backlash against civil rights was already in full swing. SITKOFF, 
supra note 73, at 210 (“As the sixties ended, however, white backlash ruled the roost.”) 
C. Vann Woodward seems to place the beginning of the backlash and the questioning 
of what the Civil Rights movement achieved at the start of the Watts riots in August 
1965. WOODWARD, supra note 57, at v. This suggests an early withdrawal from the 
Civil Rights Era meritocracy. The rioting in the summers succeeding 1965 caused 
President Johnson to establish a Commission on Civil Disorders by Executive Order in 
1967. Exec. Order No.11,365, 32 Fed. Reg. 10907 (July 29, 1967). The Commission 
issued its report in 1968 including the conclusion: “Our nation is moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white - separate and unequal.” REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 1 (1968). This 
conclusion is troubling for two reasons. First it suggests that there ever was one 
society; calling for a suspension of disbelief that the Commission was either that naive 
or this it was so steeped in meritocracy that the “playing field” actually became level 
for them in 1964. Second, the conclusion suggests that outside of the Committee and 
the 88th Congress meritocracy had never taken root, particularly among ghettoized 
blacks in northern cities for whom the remedy of sudden color-blindness meant 
nothing in terms of joblessness and its effects. With a certain amount of surprise the 
Committee reported: “What white Americans have never fully understood but what the 
Negro can never forget – is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White 
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.” Id. 
For whites, the backlash ascribed to black overreaching found political expression in 
Nixon’s 1968 victory over McGovern and the eclipse of desire to continue to unravel 
the tangled skein of slavery and more than 100 years of segregation. WOODWARD, 
supra note 57, at 190-214. In fact, there may have been few who actually continued to 
believe in Civil Rights Era meritocracy by 1973. Id. Nevertheless, the fiction of 
meritocracy prevails. Professor Selmi, for example, argues that the difficulty of 
employment discrimination cases based on race is based on a bias in the courts and that 
bias is a result of a belief by judges in the success of meritocracy expressed as 
skepticism of the “persistence of discrimination”. Selmi, Hard to Win, supra note 13, 
at 562-563. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without 
any further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when 
Lyndon Johnson was President . . . continue to have an appreciable effect upon current 
operations of schools.”). 
 295. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 378-79. 
 296. At this point the, discussion requires the tools of statutory interpretation. I am 
not entering the debate about the merits of any particular interpretive method. I have 
chosen to rely on the ground breaking work of Professors Eskridge and Frickey in their 
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legitimate a decision, the less reason the Court has to explain it. All of 
the members of the Court believed the McDonnell Douglas result 
legitimate. It has (albeit unexplained) strong foundational links.298 It is 
                                                                                                       
article Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990), 
for the necessary resources. For the purposes of this Article I rely on their descriptions 
of the various traditional schools of statutory interpretation. “The three main theories 
today emphasize (1) the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute 
(“intentionalism”); (2) the actual or presumed purpose of the statute (“purposivism” or 
“modified intentionalism”) and (3) the literal commands of the statutory text 
(“textualism”).” Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 324 (citation omitted). 
Collectively referred to as “foundationalism” or “foundationalist” approaches to 
statutory interpretation. Id. at 324-325. 
 297. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71. According to Professors Eskridge and 
Frickey, evolutive concerns cause contemporary policy concerns or values to impact 
the Court’s statutory interpretation. They point to the Court’s decision in U. S. Steel 
Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), for example, as showing evolutive concerns 
at work. Their premise for the Weber example is that “when it enacted Title VII, 
Congress assumed that outlawing color-conscious employment decisions would 
actually produce equal employment opportunity for blacks.” Id. at 359. Because blacks 
were not enjoying equal employment opportunity, “at least partly because of covert 
discrimination . . . the Court concluded in Weber that if the nation were to realize Title 
VII’s goal of providing jobs for blacks, it would have to relax the requirement of color-
blindness.” Id. Profesors Eskridge and Frickey concluded that Weber is a “clear 
example” of the Court accounting for evolutive considerations: “social and legal 
circumstances not anticipated when the statute was enacted.” Id. In other words, the 
Congress not anticipating that Title VII would fail in its purpose in effecting the social 
change of equal job opportunity, the Court stepped in and made a correction, See Id. at 
342-343 (additional argument about how the 88th Congress in 1964 could not have 
understood the need for, and therefore did not provide for, the remedy the Court 
created in Weber fifteen years later.). 
 298. On this point I must differ with Professor Sperino, supra note 19. I completely 
agree with her that we should demand more from federal employment discrimination 
law than we receive. I also agree that McDonnell Douglas establishes a false 
dichotomy between direct and circumstantial evidence in disparate treatment cases, to 
the disadvantage of claims based on circumstantial evidence. See Sperino, supra note 
19, at 773. I argue that is exactly why the false dichotomy exists. Direct evidence in 
discrimination cases is understood as a blatant reference to a proscribed characteristic 
at the time of an adverse employment decision. For example, an employer states to an 
applicant that he or she is being rejected because he or she is black. All other disparate 
treatment, or the behaviors that might reflect disparate treatment based on a proscribed 
characteristic, is based on circumstantial evidence. But the very point of the 
dichotomy, is that it prevents circumstantial evidence-based disparate treatment claims 
from being successful because Title VII was only intended to prevent the worst kinds 
of discrimination and to preserve as much of an employer’s decision–making latitude 
as possible. See discussion supra in Parts II. 
I also disagree that the McDonnell Douglas version of Title VII for individual victims 
of disparate treatment is not justified by any statutory construction methodology. 
Professor Sperino attacks McDonnell Douglas with the tools of statutory construction 
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and concludes that the Court’s result has no textualist, intentionalist, or purposivist 
grounding. See Sperino, supra note 19, at 764-74. The argument that McDonnell 
Douglas is not grounded in Title VII’s text relies solely on the operative language in 
Section 703(a). My view is that Section 703(a) cannot be read in isolation to discover 
McDonnell Douglas’ link to Title VII’s text. Section 703(a) must be read in pari 
materia with Section 706(g). Section 706(g) discusses the availability of affirmative 
relief, only where an unlawful employment practice is proved in the absence of “any 
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” § 706(g)(2)(A). The burden shifting gives life to this language by allowing the 
employer to assert “any other reason” as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 
without the burden of having to prove that reason as an affirmative defense. Moreover, 
rather than compelling an employer to assert a reason, in contrast to an employer’s 
right to make decisions for any or no reason under the at-will employment doctrine, 
McDonnell Douglas’ invitation to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is one 
that an employer may reject with little concern for the ultimate result. See Chad Derum 
& Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the 
Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2003) (“While it was 
long presumed that, in the absence of an employers unrebutted, nondiscriminatory 
reason, discrimination was the likely motivation for the defendant’s challenged action, 
courts have begun to presume that personal animosity most likely motivated the 
employer.”). 
As to Professor Sperino’s argument that the legislative history does not support the 
Court’s work in McDonnell Douglas from an intentionalist or purposivist perspective, 
see Sperino, supra note 19, at 776, 779-80, it appears that Professor Sperino does not 
give the legislative history the weight to which, I argue, it is entitled. It is true that the 
legislative history does not explicitly authorize the Court to interpret Title VII. See id. 
at 776. Title VII’s legislative history may also be “judicially incomprehensible,” id. 
(citation omitted), but it is not nonexistent. As to the development of Title VII, in 
general, and its enforcement provisions in particular, Professor Sperino does not 
acknowledge Title VII’s role as a straw man for the overriding goal of omnibus civil 
rights legislation in 1964. Or that its power was sacrificed as part of the deal because 
the key players for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 wanted Title VII to do 
very little to impact existing management prerogatives and union freedoms. See 
discussion supra Section II.B.3. Moreover, much of what appears to be the trouble 
with Title VII is its insistence on qualifications. But qualification or individual merit 
was a core theme of the Civil Rights Era, which resounds in Title VII and in the 
version of Title VII described by McDonnell Douglas in making qualification part of 
the prima facie case that establishes a presumption of discrimination. Furthermore, the 
development of Section 706(g) gives significant information about the 88th Congress’ 
intent to make it difficult for disparate treatment plaintiffs to get, or want to get, a 
financial recovery. For example, where Section 706(g) could have limited employer, 
non-discriminatory reasons to “cause” they specifically resorted to “any other reason” 
language. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.e.ii. If McDonnell Douglas’ version of 
Title VII does anything, it carries out this legislative mandate by making Title VII 
cases extremely hard to win, if winning includes affirmative relief. 
Professor Sperino’s argument that McDonnell Douglas does not reflect Title VII’s 
purpose relies on Section 703 to supply the statement of purpose. See Sperino, supra 
note 19, at 781-82. I suggest that Section 703 in isolation cannot inform a complete or 
accurate understanding of purpose. At a minimum, Section 703 must be read in 
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also rationally distinguishable from Griggs on its facts. Griggs, 
therefore, had no hold on the Court to keep it from blazing an entirely 
new trail to disparate treatment. Being the first case in its line, there 
was no need to rationalize a change in direction and explain why it was 
legitimate. Having reached a legitimate result, the extreme 
gravitational pull of stare decisis worked on the Court to keep the 
result in place and expand on it consistent with the latitude self-citation 
provides with the unacknowledged assistance of foundational links.299 
The consequence has not only been achieving the 88th Congress 
intentions from foundational point of view, but also affirming and 
nurturing a variety of behaviors that those against civil rights worked 
very hard to protect.300 Far from the “day of reckoning” predicted by 
                                                                                                       
conjunction with 706(g) if the text of Title VII is to be the source of a description of its 
purpose. When these sections are understood together, McDonnell Douglas has a 
purposivist basis that is identical to its textual basis: to limit the chances of success for 
disparate treatment cases based on circumstantial evidence. Another construction of 
“purpose” for McDonnell Douglas exists. Professors Eskridge and Frickey candidly 
describe “purpose” as “incoherent, unless one means the deal between rent-seeking 
groups and reelection minded legislators.” Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 334. 
That blunt description of purpose accurately describes Title VII’s purpose on several 
levels. Title VII was set up to be sacrificed as part of the deal to get an omnibus civil 
rights bill passed into law. See WHALENS, supra note 45, at 37. Title VII’s purpose, 
therefore, was the purpose ascribed to it by the republican legislators, whose votes 
were required to get the Civil Rights Act of 1964 out of Congress and onto President 
Johnson’s desk for signature. In order to achieve that end, Title VII’s purpose is 
summarized in the following statement: “management prerogatives and union 
freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.” H.R. REP NO. 88-
914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). McDonnell Douglas’ version of Title VII admirably serves that 
purpose. 
 299. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-73 (1989) 
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area or statutory 
interpretation, for here unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the 
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have 
done.”). 
 300. Republican Representative Meader thought Title VII an “ill-devised limitation 
upon the area of discretion and decision-making of both American business and 
American workers[,]” and for that reason among others opined that Title VII be deleted 
from the Civil Rights Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 57-58 (1963). The 
extreme conservatives paraded hot button issues like having to choose a “Negro” 
despite personal preferences against “Negros,” and hiring by quota to achieve 
numerical racial balance. They went on to predict a virtual social Armageddon: “If this 
title of this legislation becomes a statute, we predict that it will be as bitterly resented 
and equally as abortive as was the 18th Amendment [prohibition], and what it will do 
to the political equilibrium, the social tranquility, and the economic stability of the 
American society, no one can predict.” Id. at 111. “Now, I know that this so-called 
civil rights legislation has a lot of political mileage in it. It is more or less the brain 
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one Congressman, McDonnell Douglas assured that Title VII would 
never be a teaching tool for equality where potentially serious and 
frequent financial liability drove the lesson that disparate treatment had 
consequences. 
In a society where disparate treatment has never had consistent 
and heavy repercussions for decision-makers,301 McDonnell Douglas’ 
representation of Title VII is evolutive in the sense of its relationship to 
foundational links and its survivability under the dynamics of time.302 
By 1973 Title VII had been on its temporal journey for nine years. 
Presuming the existence of evolutive concerns, particularly current 
policies, the McDonnell Douglas decision reflects that there were no 
such concerns over the intervening period relating to disparate 
treatment under Title VII.303 To the degree that evolutive concerns 
attracted the Court’s attention in subsequent iterations of McDonnell 
Douglas, those concerns favored employers and may be attributable to 
a growing bias against employment discrimination claims.304 The 
ultimate result of the evolution of disparate treatment under Title VII 
was the formal statement that a claimant could prove discrimination, 
but receive no relief if an employer would have made the same 
decision for a reason detached from the claimant’s race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin.305 As a demonstration that statutes are launched 
across time to “live” as succeeding generations with changing concerns 
give them contextually appropriate meaning through interpretation, 
disparate treatment under Title VII looks like it never moved. That 
does not mean that it is not “living.” 
Title VII’s failure to evolve or move suggests that, as a nation, 
there have been and are no material evolutive concerns about this form 
of employment discrimination. The absence of such concerns over the 
                                                                                                       
child of the Americans for Democratic Action, ADA, COPE, NAACP, and other 
leftwing, radical groups. And they are whooping it up in the old corral. One of these 
days some of the white folks may get tired of this sort of carrying on. One of these 
days the white folks may decide they have taken enough. * * * These white folks may 
decide they somebody to speak up for their rights—that is, what is left of their rights 
after the politicians get through carving them up. Yes, there may yet be a day of 
reckoning.” 110 CONG. REC. 2,568 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Fisher). 
 301. See generally Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27. 
 302. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 358-59,n. 137. 
 303. Approaching 1973, the policy concerns had turned sharply against black rights 
to be free from discrimination as Nixon sought to continue to capitalize on the white-
backlash. See SITKOFF, supra note 73, at 210-12. 
 304. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27. 
 305. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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quantity and quality of discrimination that Title VII tolerates indicates 
that the tension set up between the cognition that Title VII prohibits all 
racial discrimination and the presence of racial discrimination is not 
sufficiently dissonant to cause action at the federal level. If the 
cognition of a broadly remedial Title VII is true, the absence of 
sufficient tension to cause action can be explained by the existence of a 
new cognition about racial discrimination or that the existing cognition 
has lost significance.306 A belief that racial discrimination is no longer a 
problem in America and/or a bias against employment discrimination 
claims307 would explain the lack of tension from any dissonance 
because these cognitions replace the cognition of the existence of racial 
discrimination or because, as additional cognitions they minimize the 
significance of any racial discrimination.308 
Since Congress has not amended Title VII to address concerns 
with McDonnell Douglas, the cognition of, or belief in, Title VII as 
intolerant of racial discrimination, “subtle or otherwise” is likely 
false.309 The confirmation that the McDonnell Douglas Court’s view of 
Title VII is legitimate, comes from Congress.310 There is little more to 
ask of a decision in terms of confidence in its legitimacy if the one 
body with the power to say the decision was wrong says nothing. In 
this case, Congress has said nothing to indicate that McDonnell 
                                                                                                       
 306. See Supreme Court Rhetoric, supra note 27. 
 307. See id. 
 308. The Ash litigation suggests that the cognition of racial discrimination in 
employment has lost value or has been replaced. The 11th Circuit’s initial conclusion, 
that a white man has to say “black boy,” not just “boy,” to a black man in the middle of 
Alabama describes a cognition that racial discrimination is not significant. From the 
persistence of this cognition after the Supreme Court directed the 11th Circuit to 
consider historical usage and context, one might conclude that the 11th Circuit’s 
cognition does not admit the existence of racial discrimination in employment. The 
Supreme Court’s failure to change this cognition suggests that the Court shares this 
cognition or does not consider racial discrimination in employment as a significant 
enough concern to justify its action. In other words, a white supervisor calling a black 
subordinate “boy” in the middle of Alabama caused it no cognitive dissonance. 
 309. Cooksey, supra note 84, 419-20 (1966) (arguing that Title VII will only address 
some of what he describes as “unreasonable discrimination” and concluding that “[t]he 
role of law in the area of equal employment opportunity is a limited one.”). 
 310. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502, 542 (1993) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“It is not as though Congress is unaware of our decisions concerning Title 
VII, and recent experience indicates that Congress is ready to act if we adopt 
interpretations of [Title VII] it finds to be mistaken. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Congress has taken no action to indicate that we were 
mistaken in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.”). 
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Douglas inaccurately, improperly or incorrectly implements the 
mandate of Title VII for the protection of disparate treatment 
claimants.311  In an era where there is a constant dialogue between the 
Court and Congress over civil rights,312 Congress’ silence about 
disparate treatment describes McDonnell Douglas’s legitimacy as the 
congressionally sanctioned reading of Title VII.313 
 
IV. GETTING WHAT WE NEED314 
We need something Title VII, as interpreted by the Court and 
approved by Congress, cannot give. We need an actual, as opposed to 
                                                                                                       
 311. Congress responded to the Court’s Price Waterhouse mixed motives decision in 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The Court had described that the employer’s successful 
establishment of a non-discriminatory motive as a complete defense to liability. 
Congress officially adopted the Court’s formulation of mixed motives but rather than a 
complete defense, Congress made a successful affirmative defense a bar to any 
affirmative relief. In addition to the fact that this should have been the expected result 
under a foundational reading of Section 706(g), the Congressional reaction cannot be 
seen as a correction of an illegitimate result where the response prevented a party from 
relying on the juridical fact of disparate treatment to obtain the only meaningful 
benefits Title VII might give to an individual claimant: a job, a promotion, back-pay. 
 312. See Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty 
Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1034 (2002) (Professor Beermann notes the 
legitimacy issue, commenting that: “If you start from the premise that Congress’s 
legislative power is a legitimate aspect of our system of government, then the best 
evidence of the Court’s unjustifiable obstructionism is the frequency with which 
Congress has found it necessary to legislatively overrule restrictive Supreme Court 
decisions.”). 
 313. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1357 (1952) (tracing the impotency of Congress’ Reconstruction 
era legislation to Congress’ failure to define its intentions in the text of the legislation 
and concluding, in 1952, that the remnants of the civil rights program of the 
Reconstruction era “are mute testimony to the power of the judiciary to render 
impotent the expressed will of the people.”). See also Beermann, infra note 322, at 
1034 (Noting the applicability of Professor Gressman’s criticisms of the “strict 
constructionist” Court of the post-Reconstruction era to the Court’s treatment of civil 
rights legislation in the fifty years between 1952 and 2002, concluding that: “By and 
large, the Court has obstructed Congress and stood against efforts to legislatively 
redistribute power from the advantaged to the disadvantaged.”). In the employment 
discrimination area, the best demonstration of the dynamics Professors Gressman and 
Beerman describe, is the Court’s chipping away at the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 and Congress’ restoration of the Court’s damage to national policy regarding 
the employment of the disabled in the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments 
Act of 2009. 
 314. See generally THE ROLLING STONES, YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU 
WANT (Decca Records 1969) (“You can’t always get what you want. But if you try 
sometime, yeah, You just might find–you get what you need!”). 
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rhetorical, purpose of eradicating employment discrimination, subtle or 
otherwise. We need a living definition of discrimination that accounts 
for actual human behavior including implicit bias.315 We need a method 
of proof that eliminates the artificial and unhelpful distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence so that disparate treatment is the 
sole focus of fact finding.316 
Obviously asking the Court to modify, change, improve or 
overrule McDonnell Douglas is not a good option. In the 40 years since 
McDonnell Douglas the Court’s refinements of its burden-shifting 
analysis have made things worse for disparate treatment claimants. 
Neither the Court nor Congress shows any signs of responsiveness to 
criticism of the McDonnell Douglas problem. We needn’t resort only 
to the Court or Congress. The remedy for the issue is at hand in the 
Fair Employment Practices (“FEP”) laws of the individual states. It is 
under state laws that those who desire the eradication of employment 
discrimination have been able to craft the law to achieve the results 
Title VII cannot attain. This is not to suggest that somehow, all state 
FEP laws differ in some radical way from Title VII.317 They don’t. 
What I am suggesting is that state FEP laws offers a more realistic 
possibility of getting the results we need. There is likely an actual 
intent or purpose to animate the state FEP which does not require an 
act of Congress; which is what it would take to make Title VII what we 
want it to be. 
States follow federal precedent for reasons of convenience and/or 
a fetish with symmetry. Under the right circumstances, it is easier to 
                                                                                                       
 315. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications Of Psychological Research Related To 
Unconscious Discrimination And Implicit Bias In Proving Intentional Discrimination, 
73 MO. L. REV. 83 (2008); Some Thoughts, supra note 16. 
 316. Tymkovich supra note 26. 
 317. Some states, notably Minnesota, have greater protections designed into their 
FEP laws. See e.g. M.S.A. § 363A.03 Subd. 2 (protections against age discrimination 
in employment cover people “over the age of majority.”) Montana is unique in having 
effectively abolished at-will employment with its Wrongful Discharge from 
Employment Act. M.C.A. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (a discharge is wrongful if “the discharge 
was not for good cause . . .”). By statute an employee in Montana can only be 
terminated for cause in addition to the fact that a Montana employer cannot 
discriminate because of race, color, religion sex, national origin etc. M.C.A. § 49-2-
303(1)(a). It must be acknowledged that while a Montana claimant may file concurrent 
claims under The Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act and the Montana Human 
Rights Act and federal fair employment law, the wrongful discharge claim can be 
superseded by a determination that the claimant has a cause of action under state for 
federal antidiscrimination law. Tonack v. Montana Bank of Billings, 854 P.2d 326, 331 
(Mont. 1993). 
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urge a state supreme court to abandon federal precedent in favor of 
state goals to eradicate employment discrimination than it is to ask the 
Supreme Court to overrule itself. What state jurist would reject an 
argument that the state’s courts should abandon federal precedent as a 
measure of the rights of the state’s citizens against discrimination 
where federal law’s only recommendation is its ability to check only 
the most grotesque forms of discrimination and cases like Ash bring 
even that capacity into question?  Where the state’s FEP goals lack 
necessary clarity, it is also an easier project, relative to seeking 
Congressional action, to make state law conform to what we need via 
state legislatures. Moreover, concerted efforts to achieve a critical mass 
of states that reject McDonnell Douglas stands a better chance of 
getting Congress’s attention. 
The evidence of different results comes from California, Oregon, 
Tennessee, and Missouri. California has rejected one of McDonnell 
Douglas’ least defensible offshoots: the stray comments doctrine.318 
Oregon opted out of the McDonnell Douglas fiction in 1986.319  The 
Supreme Court of Tennessee abandoned McDonnell Douglas in 
2010.320 Missouri dispensed with McDonnell Douglas in its entirety in 
                                                                                                       
 318. See Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 512, 536-46 (2010) I recognize that Price 
Waterhouse bore “stray comments.” Price Waterhouse, however, would not exist 
without McDonnell Douglas having created the distinction between direct and indirect 
methods of proof in disparate treatment cases. Moreover, Justice O’Conner referenced 
“stray comments” in connection with circumstantial evidence to distinguish them from 
the stereotypical comments about Anne Hopkins that Price Waterhouse partners made 
about her promotability that Justice O’Connor considered to be direct evidence of 
discrimination. 
 319. See Callan v. Confederation of Or. Sch. Adm’rs., 717 P.2d 1252 (1986) ( “the 
objective of finding the facts correctly is not advanced by the artifice of making a 
chronological progression of evidentiary burdens the basis for deciding whether either 
party is entitled to survive the other’s motion for summary judgment or a directed 
verdict.”). 
 320. Gossett v. Tractor Supply Company, Inc., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010) 
superseded by statute TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-
311(e). The stated basis for the Gossett decision was not that Tennessee employment 
discrimination law was different from Title VII, but that the McDonnell Douglas 
burden shifting analysis was inconsistent with Tennessee’s civil procedure rules 
governing summary judgment. Gossett, at 782 (“An employer therefore may meet its 
burden of production pursuant to McDonnell Douglas without satisfying the burden of 
production set forth in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04 for a party moving for 
summary judgment.”) The Gossett court, however, specifically noted that the usual 
federal outcome, summary judgment for the employer based on the asserted legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason, was problematic because “[a] legitimate reason for a 
discharge . . . is not always mutually exclusive of a discriminatory or retaliatory motive 
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2007.321 Missouri’s road to what we need arguably provides the best 
result. 
Missouri’s FEP law, the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) 
became state law in 1961.322 The MHRA defines “discrimination” in 
employment as “any unfair treatment based on race, color, religion, 
national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates to employment”323 
Missouri courts had evaluated disparate treatment claims using 
McDonnell Douglas since at least 1978.324 The Missouri Supreme 
Court officially adopted McDonnell Douglas in 1984 because a 
substantial number of other states had done so and because it “offers ‘a 
sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common 
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.’”325 So, 
despite the definition of “discrimination,” MHRA disparate treatment 
claimants would remain as disadvantaged as any Title VII claimant for 
twenty-three years. 
In 2003, the first of two developments occurred that paved the 
way for the Missouri Supreme Court to abandon McDonnell Douglas 
in its 2007 Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights326 decision. In 2003 
the Missouri Supreme Court held that MHRA claimants had a right to a 
jury trial in State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley.327 The second development 
occurred in 2005, because the Diehl decision caused the adoption of a 
                                                                                                       
and thus does not preclude the possibility that a discriminatory or retaliatory motive 
played a role in the discharge decision.” Id. The Tennessee legislature swiftly 
responded to Gossett. In 2011 the Tennessee legislature enacted a law to compel 
Tennessee state courts to follow Tennessee federal court summary judgment rules. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101. Simultaneously the Tennessee legislature codified the 
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis as part of the Tennessee Human Rights 
Act. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-311(e). 
 321. See Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, (Mo. 2007). 
 322. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-137 (2000). 
 323. Id. § 213,010 (5) (emphasis added). Missouri does not keep legislative histories 
so there is no way to know how the legislators at the time made the logical decision to 
define “discrimination” or to use the “any unfair treatment” formulation. As the 
MHRA preceded Title VII, however, the decision to define “discrimination” and the 
definition cannot be seen as a response to Title VII.  
 324. See General Motors Corp. v. Fair Emp’t Practices Div., 574 S.W.2d 394, 397 
(Mo. 1978). 
 325. Midstate Oil Co. v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Mo. 
1984). 
 326. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 814. 
 327. State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 92 (Mo. 2003). Note that 
Congress had already given Title VII plaintiffs the right to a jury trial in the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act. 
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pattern jury instruction for MHRA cases.328 The Missouri Approved 
Instruction (“MAI”) directs the jury to find for the plaintiff if the jury 
believes that plaintiff’s race, for example, “was a contributing factor” 
to the adverse employment action.329 
The Daugherty court determined that MAI 31.24 called into question 
the reliability of McDonnell Douglas in the summary judgment 
analysis of claims under the MHRA.330 Without explicitly describing 
McDonnell Douglas as a substantive hurdle for Title VII plaintiffs, the 
Daugherty court held that: “Analyzing summary judgment decisions 
under the standards set forth in MAI 31.24 [a contributing factor] is 
appropriate because a plaintiff has no higher standard to survive 
summary judgment than is required to submit a claim to a jury.”331 
After Daugherty, Missouri courts have given meaning to the 
standard rhetoric that summary judgment should seldom be used in 
employment discrimination cases because they are so fact intensive 
                                                                                                       
 328. See Missouri Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.). All Missouri 
juries are instructed from the Missouri Approved Instructions (“MAI”). A deviation 
from the MAI is grounds for reversal. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 70.02 
(b), (c) (6th ed.). 
 329. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.). 
 330. Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at, 819. 
 331. Id. at 820. The Daugherty court, of course recognized McDonnell Douglas for 
what it is and continues to be a substantive, rather than procedural, aspect of the 
Court’s interpretation of Title VII, which causes Title VII plaintiffs to have to prove 
more at summary judgment than the same plaintiff would have to prove at trial. 
McDonnell Douglas is such a powerful wolf in sheep’s clothing that, in states like 
Oregon, defense counsel urge federal judges to evaluate state FEP claims under 
McDonnell Douglas because it is merely a “procedural tool” and as a federal procedure 
is properly employed under the Erie doctrine. See Snead v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. 
Co., 237 F. 3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Gacek v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 614 F. 
3d 298 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., discussing applicability of McDonnell Douglas as a 
procedural tool in an Illinois worker’s compensation wrongful discharge case and 
concluding: “But when a retaliatory discharge case governed by Illinois law is litigated 
in a federal court, the federal court must apply the standard of the state law to a motion 
for summary judgment, and not the federal standard, because the standards are 
materially different and the difference is rooted in a substantive policy of the state. We 
are confirmed in this conclusion by the Supreme Court’s very recent decision in Gross 
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). The question was whether the 
rule of Price Waterhouse, shifting the burden of proving causation in Title VII cases 
from plaintiff to defendant, should also govern cases under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. The Supreme Court in Gross said no, thus treating the burden-
shifting rule not as a substantively neutral rule of procedure but as a rule limited to a 
particular statute, in that case Title VII. McDonnell Douglas has a broader domain of 
applicability, at least as understood by the lower federal courts, but still a domain 
defined by a substantive category, namely discrimination.”). 
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and the outcomes depend on determinations of motive.332 Since 
Daugherty there have been no reported successful summary judgments 
by defendants under the MHRA in Missouri state courts. 
In addition to making the plaintiff’s burden of proof a 
“contributing factor”333 rather than a “motivating factor,”334 Missouri 
gives its employment discrimination teeth by limiting questions of 
“legitimate business reasons” to fact questions to be raised on summary 
judgment or to be argued in front of a jury. Any employer may also 
make the reason for an adverse employment decision an affirmative 
defense.335 If a jury believes the affirmative defense the employer 
avoids liability.336 Missouri law does not permit a mixed motives 
defense.337 
Some would argue that Missouri goes too far in eradicating 
employment discrimination.338 It not only dispenses with all of the 
problems of McDonnell Douglas, it effectively makes any adverse 
personnel decision a viable claim for discrimination because a 
“contributing factor” amounts to an extremely broad “any taint” 
standard.339 If the goal is to eradicate all employment discrimination, 
subtle or otherwise, an “any taint” standard is the best place to start. 
Employers, at least in Missouri, find themselves learning that they 
cannot avoid liability at summary judgment. The focus of the case 
begins and ends with the question of discrimination rather than the 
distraction of legitimate non-discriminatory business reasons, stray 
comments, same actor inferences and other defenses which enable the 
kind of disparate treatment we believed Title VII was meant to prevent. 
                                                                                                       
 332. “Summary judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination 
cases, because such cases are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences 
rather than on direct evidence. Summary judgment should not be granted unless 
evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the non-movant.” Daugherty, 
231 S.W.3d at 818.   
 333. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.). 
 334. See Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions-Instruction 5.96 
(2008). 
 335. Mo. Approved Jury Instructions (Civil) 31.25 (6th ed.). 
 336. Id. 
 337. In Missouri, the employer has only the option to argue that the employee did 
not prove that a proscribed criterion was a “contributing factor” or to assert an 
affirmative defense that the employee was fired for a legitimate business reason under 
MAI 31.25. 
 338. See Kelly, Wiese, GOP looks to roll back Supreme Court decisions, MO. 
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Sept. 20, 2010, at 1. 
 339. See discussion of the causation issue supra section II.B.3.e.  
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Most important of all, under Missouri law you cannot both 
discriminate on the basis of a proscribed characteristic and avoid 
liability. The law acknowledges the existence of mixed motives, but, 
unlike Title VII, none of them can be race, color, religion, national 
origin or sex because the purpose of the MHRA is the eradication of 
employment discrimination. 
If eradicating employment discrimination, subtle or otherwise, is 
the purpose and intent of the law, then a state would have to abandon 
McDonnell Douglas at a minimum. When McDonnell Douglas is gone 
there is no artificial distinction between circumstantial and direct 
evidence and the fact finder immediately goes to the issue of 
discrimination vel non. The door will be open for arguments based on 
implicit bias. There will be no motivational inferences at all. Summary 
judgment would become immediately anomalous in disparate treatment 
cases because in McDonnell Douglas’ absence, courts would have to 
respect the fact that motivations and intentions are credibility 
determinations at heart which cannot be determined on the briefs. A 
next step would be a definition for discrimination, if it does not already 
exist. The definition need not go so far as “any unfair treatment.” 
“Discrimination” could be defined as any adverse employment action 
or differentiation in treatment not supported by objective factors such 
as job qualifications or job performance.340 Finally, the point of 
eradicating employment discrimination cannot be driven home in an 
environment where an employer can avoid all financial liability by 
claiming mixed-motives.341 To the degree that a state might tolerate 
discriminatory animus being mitigated by other legitimate objective 
and true reasons, fault should be apportioned.342 In that way, if there is 
any discrimination, the discriminator is always financially responsible 
for the harm caused to the victim of discrimination. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Civil Rights Era was a golden opportunity to begin the actual 
extirpation of discrimination as a social norm. Title VII could have 
been a way to ultimately correct the actual shortcomings of a society 
steeped in disparate treatment. It could have been engineered to make 
                                                                                                       
 340. See discussion of definitions of discrimination supra section II.B.3.e.i. 
 341. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Civil Right Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No.102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 342. It is standard practice under tort law to apportion fault and make those at fault 
liable for proportional damages. 
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its purpose the righting of a historical wrong by specifically 
recognizing the continuing impact of segregation on the ability of its 
intended beneficiaries and on the beliefs and behaviors of those who 
benefitted the most from the status quo. Title VII could have stood for 
the proposition that any discrimination was too much discrimination. If 
workplace discrimination had a high price tag, soon enough, 
discrimination would cease to make sense. The claim that it is 
impossible to legislate belief is simply that—a claim. The validity of 
the impossibility of legislating belief could have been tested. The will 
to test the validity of the claim was absent; the window of opportunity 
closed. 
Instead, Title VII represents both a forgone opportunity and a 
statement of moral infirmity. The right to be free from all but the most 
obvious employment discrimination took a back seat to other demands 
on the apparently finite resource of rights or interests. Congress and the 
Court specifically identified some of these more valuable rights and 
interests: A trial by judge or jury rather than a potentially interested 
administrative body; the overarching interest in efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship. Underlying these direct statements, one 
senses recognition that granting Title VII rights endangered the rights 
of the majority. Indeed, the cost of Title VII rights was so keenly 
perceived that no amount of rhetoric could mask it. From that 
recognition the majority took specific action to preserve its rights by 
making Title VII relief profoundly unavailable. That fact does not 
make Title VII structurally unsound. Nor does it make the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations illegitimate. Title VII works. 
In the absence of a Title VII that actually performs the function of 
eradicating workplace discrimination hope lives yet. Congress and the 
Supreme Court are not the only game in town. In the states it is 
possible to avoid what we do not want and get what we need. Missouri, 
for example, represents a world without McDonnell Douglas, where it 
is safe to believe that the purpose of laws against employment 
discrimination is the end of discrimination in employment. Admittedly, 
seeking relief on this issue in the states is an iffy proposition. The 
farther we move through time, the easier it becomes to believe that race 
is not an issue, so why do anything? Those who want to believe that 
race discrimination does not occur will adopt and adhere to that belief. 
However, with the constancy of race based economic disparities, the 
conclusion that America has moved beyond race cannot tolerate very 
much scrutiny. The 1967 Commission on Civil Disorders concluded 
that society is becoming separate and unequal. That society is separate 
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and unequal is subject to empirical confirmation by walking across 
campus or walking around a neighborhood. 
No one can promise that pursuing a solution in the states will 
uniformly produce instant results. After almost forty years of 
McDonnell Douglas, anything is better than a Title VII that works. 
And if over the course of the next forty years work in the states results 
in any workplace discrimination leading to some unavoidable liability 
on the part of the discriminator, the investment will have been well 
worth the effort. 
* * * 
